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Doctoring Discrimination  
in the Same-Sex Marriage Debates 
ELIZABETH SEPPER* 
As the legalization of same-sex marriage spreads across the states, some 
religious believers refuse to serve same-sex married couples. In the academy, a 
group of law and religion scholars frames these refusals as “conscientious 
objection” to the act of marriage. They propose “marriage conscience protection” 
that would allow public employees and private individuals or businesses to refuse 
to “facilitate” same-sex marriages. They rely on the theoretical premise that 
commercial actors’ objections to marriage are equivalent to doctors’ objections to 
controversial medical procedures. They model their proposal on medical 
conscience legislation, which allows doctors to refuse to perform abortions. Such 
legislation, they say, would dispel conflicts over same-sex marriage and lead to 
acceptance of gay couples’ relationships. 
This Article argues that same-sex marriage objections lack the distinct and 
compelling features of conscientious objection recognized by law. It offers the first 
systemic critique of medicine as a construct for the same-sex marriage debates. It 
demonstrates that legislative protection of conscientious objection traditionally has 
been limited to life-and-death acts for which the objector has direct responsibility 
and further justified in medicine by ethical commitments particular to the 
profession—bases that are absent from the marriage context. By identifying the 
theoretical foundation of conscientious objection protections, this Article provides 
the groundwork for distinguishing between conscience claims that can be justified 
and those that cannot, in medicine and beyond.  
 This Article further contends that the experience of medical conscience 
legislation represents a cautionary tale, rather than the success story that marriage 
conscience proponents claim. Conscience protection in the medical model could 
actually increase conflict and entrench opposition. Ultimately, these critiques 
undermine the theoretical and practical foundations of “marriage conscience 
protection.” They suggest that antidiscrimination law, where we have traditionally 
balanced religion and equality, constitutes a more useful lens through which to 
view religious accommodation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“I will not injure or kill another human being,” Elliott Welsh told the draft 
board.1 His objection to participating in war did not come from a “still, small voice 
of conscience” but rather was “so loud and insistent” that he preferred 
imprisonment to the Armed Forces.2 
 “I must be obedient to the word of God. From his own mouth he said ‘Thou 
shalt not kill,’” labor and delivery nurse Yvonne Shelton stated.3 She could not 
“participate in a procedure that would end a life” and thus refused to assist in 
abortions.4 
Photographing a lesbian couple’s commitment ceremony “would disobey God 
and the teachings of the Bible,” the owners of Elane Photography contended.5 Their 
religious beliefs meant they could not photograph the couple’s ceremony. As a 
result of their refusal, they faced and lost an antidiscrimination suit.6 
A group of law and religion scholars, including Douglas Laycock, Robin 
Fretwell Wilson, Thomas Berg, Carl Esbeck, and Richard Garnett, frame each of 
these cases as “conscientious objection.”7 As states enact marriage equality, these 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343 (1970) (plurality opinion) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 2. Id. at 337 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 3. Shelton v. Univ. Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 4. Id. at 223 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 5. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 432 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 
309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013). 
 6. See id. at 433. 
 7. See Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have 
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scholars, occasionally joined by others, come together to advocate for their 
proposed “marriage conscience protection” (MCP) statute that would allow 
businesses and individuals engaged in commerce to refuse to facilitate same-sex 
marriages.8 Under the proposal, religiously affiliated organizations—hospitals, 
                                                                                                                 
in Common, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206 (2010); Maggie Gallagher, Why Accommodate? 
Reflections on the Gay Marriage Culture Wars, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 260 (2010); 
Douglas W. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns 
Against Religion, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 103 (Douglas Laycock, 
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008); Douglas Laycock, 
Afterword, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra, at 189, 194–95; Roger 
Severino, Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, 30 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 939 (2007); Marc D. Stern, Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 NW. 
J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 307 (2010); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for 
Same-Sex Marriage from the Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY, supra, at 77; Fredric J. Bold, Jr., Comment, Vows to Collide: The Burgeoning 
Conflict Between Religious Institutions and Same-Sex Marriage Antidiscrimination Laws, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 179 (2009). 
 8. The only clear point of disagreement between these scholars is their support for, 
opposition to, or agnosticism toward same-sex marriage. Letter from Thomas C. Berg, St. 
Ives Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law, 
Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. & Richard 
W. Garnett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., to Christopher G. Donovan, 
Conn. Speaker of the House (Apr. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Berg et al. Conn. Ltr.], available at 
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/letter-to-rep.-donovan-re-bill-899-04-20-09.pdf; Letter 
from Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Robin Fretwell 
Wilson, Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of 
Law, Univ. of Mo. & Richard W. Garnett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., 
to John Baldacci, Governor of Me. (May 1, 2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice
.blogs.com/files/sp-384-me-letter-to-governor.pdf; Letter from Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives 
Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law, 
Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. & Richard 
W. Garnett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., to John Lynch, Governor of 
N.H. (May 1, 2009) [hereinafter Berg et al. N.H. Ltr.], available at http://mirrorofjustice
.blogs.com/files/letter-to-gov1.-lynch-re-h.b.-436-1.pdf; Letter from Douglas Laycock, Yale 
Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., to John Baldacci, Governor of Me. 
(Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/08
/memosletters-on-religious-liberty-and-samesex-marriage.html; Letter from Douglas 
Laycock, Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law & Professor of Religious Studies, 
Univ. of V.A., Michael Perry, Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Emory Univ. & Marc 
D. Stern to Lisa Brown, Senate Majority Leader, Wash. State Senate (Jan. 28, 2012), 
available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/washington2012-me-too-brown.pdf; Letter 
from Douglas Laycock, Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., to 
Christopher G. Donovan, Conn. Speaker of the House (Apr. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Laycock 
Conn. Ltr.], available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/04/samesex
-marriage-and-religious-liberty-issues-in-connecticut.html; Letter from Douglas Laycock, 
Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., Andrew Koppelman, John Paul 
Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern Univ., Michael Perry, Robert W. Woodruff 
Professor of Law, Emory Univ. & Marc D. Stern, Acting Co-Exec. Dir., Am. Jewish Cong., 
to Iowa lawmakers (July 15, 2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirror
ofjustice/2009/08/memosletters-on-religious-liberty-and-samesex-marriage.html; Letter 
Douglas Laycock, Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., Andrew 
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insurance companies, social service providers, and the like—could exclude gay 
                                                                                                                 
Koppelman, John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern Univ., Michael Perry, 
Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Emory Univ. & Marc D. Stern, Acting Co-Exec. 
Dir., Am. Jewish Cong., to John Lynch, Governor of N.H. (May 22, 2009), available at 
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/newhampshireexemptionslynch2.pdf; Letter from 
Douglas Laycock, Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., Andrew 
Koppelman, John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern Univ., Michael Perry, 
Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Emory Univ. & Marc D. Stern, Acting Co-Exec. 
Dir., Am. Jewish Cong., to David A. Paterson, Governor of N.Y. (May 8, 2009), available at 
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/08/memosletters-on-religious-liberty
-and-samesex-marriage.html; Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law, Wash. 
& Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Thomas C. Berg, James Oberstar Professor of Law & Pub. Pol’y, 
Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo., Richard 
W. Garnett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., Marc D. Stern & Edward 
McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Professor of Law, Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law to Brian E. Frosh, 
Chairman, Md. State Sen. (Jan. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Wilson et al. Md. Ltr.], available at 
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/maryland-letter-1.pdf; Letter from Robin Fretwell 
Wilson, Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives 
Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of 
Mo., Richard W. Garnett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., Marc D. Stern, 
Acting Co-Exec. Dir./Gen. Counsel, Am. Jewish Cong. & Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., 
Professor of Law, Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law, to Iowa lawmakers (July 9, 2009), 
available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/08/memosletters-on
-religious-liberty-and-samesex-marriage.html; Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor 
of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives Professor, Univ. of St. 
Thomas Sch. of Law, Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo., Richard W. Garnett, 
Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., Marc D. Stern, Acting Co-Exec. 
Dir./Gen. Counsel, Am. Jewish Cong., & Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Professor of Law, 
Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law, to Jamie Pedersen, Representative, Wash. State Legislature 
(Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/washington-followup
-house-members-6239-es2.7.2012-1.pdf; Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of 
Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives Professor, Univ. of St. 
Thomas Sch. of Law, Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo., Richard W. Garnett, 
Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., Marc D. Stern, Acting Co-Exec. 
Dir./Gen. Counsel, Am. Jewish Cong. & Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Professor of Law, 
Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law to Paul A. Sarlo, N.J. Senate Judiciary Comm. Chairman 
(Dec. 4, 2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/12-4-2009-nj-sarlo-ssm
-letter-1.pdf; Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. 
of Law, Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Carl H. 
Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo., Richard W. Garnett, Professor of Law, Univ. of 
Notre Dame Law Sch., Marc D. Stern, Acting Co-Exec. Dir./Gen. Counsel, Am. Jewish 
Cong. & Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Professor of Law, Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law, to 
Sheldon Silver, N.Y. Assemblyman (May 8, 2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice
.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/05/scholars-letter-re-ssm-and-religious-liberty.html; Letter 
from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Thomas C. 
Berg, James Oberstar Professor of Law & Pub. Policy, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, 
Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo., Richard W. Garnett, Professor of Law, 
Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., Marc D. Stern & Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Professor 
of Law, Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law, to Dean G. Skelos, Senator of N.Y. (May 17, 2011) 
[hereinafter Wilson et al. N.Y. Ltr.], available at http://www.nysun.com/files
/lawprofessorsletter.pdf. 
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couples from employee spousal benefits, deny them visitation privileges, and refuse 
to treat their marriages as valid throughout their married lives.9 Small retailers, 
rental agencies, and professionals could assert religious objections to selling goods 
or services to same-sex married (or marrying) couples.10 A dress shop could 
prevent a lesbian from saying yes to her wedding dress. A landlord could deny a 
same-sex married couple a home. Lawyers could refuse to prepare prenuptial 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. The proposed statutory text reads: 
 (a) Religious organizations protected.  
. . . [N]o religious or denominational organization, no organization operated for 
charitable or educational purposes which is supervised or controlled by or in 
connection with a religious organization, and no individual employed by any of 
the foregoing organizations, while acting in the scope of that employment, shall 
be required to  
(1) provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or 
privileges for a purpose related to the solemnization or celebration of any 
marriage; or  
(2) solemnize any marriage; or  
(3) treat as valid any marriage  
if such providing, solemnizing, or treating as valid would cause such 
organizations or individuals to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs. 
Wilson et al. Md. Ltr., supra note 8, at 3. 
 10. The proposed text reads: 
 (b) Individuals and small businesses protected.  
 (1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2), no individual, sole proprietor, or 
small business shall be required to  
(A) provide goods or services that assist or promote the solemnization or 
celebration of any marriage, or provide counseling or other services that 
directly facilitate the perpetuation of any marriage; or  
(B) provide benefits to any spouse of an employee; or  
(C) provide housing to any married couple  
if providing such goods, services, benefits, or housing would cause such 
individuals or sole proprietors, or owners of such small businesses, to violate 
their sincerely held religious beliefs. 
 (2) Paragraph (b)(1) shall not apply if  
(A) a party to the marriage is unable to obtain any similar good or 
services, employment benefits, or housing elsewhere without substantial 
hardship; or  
(B) in the case of an individual who is a government employee or 
official, if another government employee or official is not promptly 
available and willing to provide the requested government service 
without inconvenience or delay; provided that no judicial officer 
authorized to solemnize marriages shall be required to solemnize any 
marriage if to do so would violate the judicial officer’s sincerely held 
religious beliefs. 
 (3) A “small business” within the meaning of paragraph (b)(1) is a legal 
entity other than a natural person  
(A) that provides services which are primarily performed by an owner of 
the business; or  
(B) that has five or fewer employees; or (C) in the case of a legal entity 
that offers housing for rent, that owns five or fewer units of housing. 
Id. at 3–4 (emphasis omitted). 
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agreements. With MCP, gay couples could face discrimination from “I do” until 
death do them part.  
These scholars claim “marriage conscience protection” does not break new 
ground, but rather is part of a long tradition of legal recognition of conscientious 
objection to military service, execution, and abortion.11 In particular, they rely on 
the premise that commercial actors’ objections to same-sex marriage are equivalent 
to doctors’ refusals to perform controversial procedures—abortion in particular.12 
By linking abortion and same-sex marriage, MCP proponents seek to include 
same-sex marriage legislation within the traditional (and circumscribed) areas 
where law explicitly protects conscientious objection (such as serving as a soldier, 
participating in the death penalty, and providing controversial medical 
interventions).  
This Article argues that same-sex marriage objections lack the distinct and 
compelling features of conscientious objection recognized by law. It offers the first 
systemic critique of the theoretical premise for extending the conscientious objector 
model to the same-sex marriage debates. It demonstrates that legislative protection 
of conscientious objection traditionally has been limited to life-and-death acts over 
which the objector has direct responsibility and further justified in medicine by 
ethical commitments particular to the profession—bases that are absent from the 
marriage context. The Article further contends that, even if marriage and medical 
conscientious objections shared a theoretical foundation, medical conscience 
legislation proves a poor model for protecting conscience. Legislation in its image 
would be unlikely to create an enduring solution to the conflict between religious 
objection and gay rights. 
Part I describes religious objections to same-sex marriage and the scholarly 
debate over legislative accommodation of these objections. It shows that our legal 
system traditionally balances religion and equality within the antidiscrimination 
framework.13 MCP would instead treat refusal as “conscientious objection” to the 
act of marriage that lies beyond the scope of antidiscrimination law. Part II 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. Id. at 6 (citing as precedent federal laws permitting conscientious objectors to 
military service and “accommodating health care professionals who conscientiously object to 
participating in medical procedures such as abortion or sterilization”).  
 12. Id. (linking proposal to “other laws protecting the right of conscientious objection, 
especially in the health care context”). 
 13. See generally Michael Kent Curtis, A Unique Religious Exemption from 
Antidiscrimination Laws in the Case of Gays? Putting the Call for Exemptions for Those 
Who Discriminate Against Married or Marrying Gays in Context, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
173 (2012); Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 123; Taylor Flynn, Clarion Call or 
False Alarm: Why Proposed Exemptions to Equal Marriage Statutes Return Us to a 
Religious Understanding of the Public Marketplace, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 236 (2010); 
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 
5 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 274 (2010); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex 
Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1169 (2012); Mark Strasser, On Same-Sex Marriage and 
Matters of Conscience, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1 (2010); Shannon Gilreath, Not a 
Moral Issue: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 205 (reviewing 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 7). 
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establishes the MCP proposal is explicitly modeled on legislative protection of 
physicians’ refusals to perform abortions.  
Part III argues that same-sex marriage objections, as well as some recent claims 
in medicine, lack the distinct and compelling features of conscientious objection 
recognized by law. Drawing on legal and bioethical discussions, it identifies five 
principles justifying legal recognition of conscientious objection. The first three—
involvement in the taking of life and the objector’s necessity and proximity to the 
alleged bad act—support conscientious objection across the contexts of war, 
execution, and abortion. The second two—the centrality of moral reasoning to 
medicine and the grounding of objections in professional ethics—bolster physicians’ 
specific claim to act on conscience. The identification of these principles constitutes a 
significant contribution to discussions of conscientious objection in marriage, 
medicine, and beyond, allowing us to distinguish those protections that are justified 
from those that are not. It becomes clear that objections to providing goods and 
services to same-sex couples do not reflect these settled bases.  
Part IV contends that even if there were significant similarities between abortion 
and same-sex marriage objection, medical conscience legislation is a poor model, 
failing to safeguard conscience consistently and effectively.14 Protecting corporate 
“conscience” inevitably undermines individual conscience. When a business forbids 
serving same-sex couples, individual employees who believe all should be treated 
equally will be forced to violate their consciences or lose their employment.  
Part V argues that the experience of medical conscience clauses nonetheless offers 
lessons for legislatures considering religious exemptions. Instead of providing a “live-
and-let-live solution” as its advocates predict,15 the medical model seems likely to 
entrench opposition to gay equality and impose heavy burdens on same-sex couples.  
As an increasing number of states move to legalize same-sex marriage,16 we can 
expect more claims of religious objection and calls for legislatures to enact marriage 
conscience protection. Engaging with MCP is particularly pressing because its 
proponents have been at the vanguard of public discourse and scholarly debate. While 
no state legislature has enacted their proposal in full, several have adopted narrower 
versions.17 Others have debated adopting MCP.18 With new challenges to state 
marriage bans based on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor,19 
the question of religious objections will only become more salient.20 Ultimately, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. See generally Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA L. REV. 1501 
(2012). 
 15. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Life After 
Prop 8, 14 NEXUS 101, 109 (2009). 
 16. Adam Wollner, The Map of Gay Marriage: Hawaii Becomes Latest to Legalize, 
NPR.ORG (Nov. 13, 2013, 5:52 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/11/13
/245001905/the-map-of-gay-marriage-hawaii-becomes-latest-to-legalize (reporting that 2013 
was “a landmark year for the gay-rights movement” with same-sex marriage legalized in 
Illinois, Hawaii, Delaware, Minnesota, Rhode Island, California, and New Jersey). 
 17. See infra notes 117–21 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
 19. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 20. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, Jernigan v. Crane, 
No.4:13-cv-00410-JLH (E.D. Ark. July 15, 2013) (challenging “the constitutionality of 
Arkansas’s laws excluding same-gender couples from marriage and forbidding recognition 
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theoretical and practical critiques advanced here lend support to the argument that 
antidiscrimination, not conscientious objection, is the appropriate lens through which 
to consider any religious accommodation. 
I. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE TURN TOWARD CONSCIENCE 
Throughout its history, the gay rights movement has faced claims that recognizing 
LGBT equality would impose burdens on the religious liberty of those who object to 
gay sex or coupling.21 As today’s most prominent gay rights issue, same-sex marriage 
has been no different.  
This Part sets forth the debates over religious objection and same-sex marriage. 
Section A describes the expansion of marriage equality and the attendant objections 
from religious believers. Section B identifies a split over the appropriate legal 
framework for any potential accommodation of religious objectors.  
A. Religious Objection to Marriage Equality 
States are increasingly expanding—rather than limiting—marriage equality. Thus 
far, lawmakers have enacted same-sex marriage in Illinois, Hawaii, Minnesota, 
Delaware, Rhode Island, Maryland, Washington, New York, New Hampshire, 
Vermont, and the District of Columbia.22 New Jersey and California legislators also 
passed marriage equality acts, which were then vetoed.23 Maine voters recently 
approved same-sex marriage, after initially rejecting legalization efforts by the 
legislature.24 That is not to suggest that state engagement has been uniformly favorable 
                                                                                                                 
of legitimate same-gender marriages entered into in other states”); Ivey DeJesus, Gay, 
Lesbian Couples File Lawsuit Challenging Pennsylvania Marriage Law, PENN LIVE (July 9, 
2013, 10:00 PM), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2013/07/same-sex_marriage
_gay_marriage.html; Frank Green, Class-Action Suit Challenges Va.’s Same-Sex Marriage 
Ban, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Aug. 1, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://www.timesdispatch.com
/news/state-regional/ap/another-federal-suit-challenges-va-gay-marriage-ban/article
_b8b797ea-fa88-11e2-a17c-001a4bcf6878.html; Jessie Halladay, Couple Challenges 
Kentucky Law Against Gay Marriage, USA Today (July 26, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.usa
today.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/26/same-sex-marriage-kentucky/2589379; see also 
Matthew Brown, Overstock Executive Launches Campaign to Amend Utah Constitution over 
Religious Liberty, DESERET NEWS (Sept. 20, 2013 1:10 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com
/article/865584444/Overstock-executive-launches-campaign-to-amend-Utah-Constitution
-over-religious-liberty.html (reporting on a new multistate campaign to exempt religious 
organizations, and potentially secular businesses from recognizing same-sex marriages). 
 21. See generally THOMAS M. MESSNER, HERITAGE FOUND., SAME SEX MARRIAGE AND 
THE THREAT TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, NO. 2201 (2008), available at http://www.heritage.org
/research/reports/2008/10/same-sex-marriage-and-the-threat-to-religious-liberty; Laycock, 
supra note 7.  
 22. See Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 26, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human
-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx.  
 23. See, e.g., Assemb. 1, 215th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2012); Assemb. B. 19, 
Assemb., 2005–2006 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).  
 24. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 650-A (2012). 
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to gay rights; although sixteen states and the District of Columbia currently allow same-
sex marriage,25 twenty-nine states have constitutional bars against it.26 
Nonetheless, a remarkable change in public opinion suggests access to same-sex 
marriage will continue to expand. In 2011, for the first time a majority of 
Americans said that same-sex marriage should be legalized.27 The shift has 
occurring rapidly, with support rising from 37% to 58% over the last decade.28  
Faced with potential reform, some religious adherents object that marriage 
equality represents a threat to their religious liberty, forcing them to participate in 
same-sex marriage. They describe objections that fall into three categories. The 
first category relates to performing or licensing marriages. With legalization of 
same-sex marriage, couples will require marriage licenses and officiating from 
public officials.29 Some, like the clerks in New York and Massachusetts who 
resigned rather than issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, may raise 
religious objections.30  
The second category of objections concerns goods and services for weddings. 
Caterers, bakers, florists, and other commercial enterprises involved in wedding 
ceremonies may seek to withhold their services out of religious opposition to same-
sex marriage.31 The experience of Elane Photography, a business in New Mexico 
that was sued for refusing to photograph a lesbian couple’s commitment ceremony, 
figures prominently as an example of such a conflict used by proponents of broad 
religious exemptions.32 Another frequently cited case is Bernstein v. Ocean Grove 
Camp Meeting Ass’n,33 in which the Methodist ministry organization that owns the 
town of Ocean Grove, New Jersey, rejected a lesbian couple’s request to reserve a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. Gay Marriage in the U.S.: A Look at States Which Allow Same-Sex Couples to Wed, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 20, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/21/gay
-marriage-across-the-nation_n_4313018.html. 
 26. Defining Marriage, supra note 22 (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin). 
 27. See Frank Newport, Half of Americans Support Legal Gay Marriage, GALLUP 
POLITICS (May 8, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/154529/half-americans-support-legal
-gay-marriage.aspx. 
 28. Same-Sex Marriage, Gay Rights—ABC News/Wash. Post Poll, Mar. 7–10, 2013, 
POLLINGREPORT.com, http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm. 
 29. Laycock, supra note 7, at 194–95. Despite frequent claims that legalization of same-
sex marriage will require clergy or religious organizations to perform marriages in violation 
of their beliefs, these concerns are unfounded. See infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 30. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Arrives at Moment for Same-Sex Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2004, at A16 (reporting that twelve justices of the peace resigned in 
Massachusetts); Thomas Kaplan, Rights Collide as Town Clerk Sidesteps Role in Gay 
Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2011, at A1 (reporting that in New York, two clerks 
resigned and one appointed a deputy to issue licenses by appointment for gay couples). 
 31. See, e.g., Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, No. 11-1-3103-12 ECN, 2013 WL 
1614105 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Apr. 11, 2013) (order granting summary judgment in favor of 
same-sex couple refused service at a bed and breakfast). 
 32. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013). 
 33. No. PN34XB-03008 (N.J. Div. on Civ. Rights Dec. 29, 2008). 
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pavilion on the boardwalk for their civil union. Recently, numerous reports have 
surfaced of bakeries and dress shops refusing to serve same-sex couples.34  
The third category applies to acknowledging a same-sex marriage as valid and 
treating persons in same-sex marriages equally in employment and the delivery of 
goods and services. Same-sex married couples will require third parties to 
recognize their married status for purposes of employee benefits, insurance, 
hospital visitation, medical decision making, litigation, and more.35 Housing 
similarly could be implicated, as when Yeshiva University’s Albert Einstein 
College of Medicine faced a discrimination suit for its exclusion of unmarried 
couples from married student housing, which effectively discriminated against gay 
students.36  
More broadly, supporters of wide-ranging religious exemptions identify a set of 
commercial actors and social service providers (religiously affiliated and not) that 
seek to refuse to deal with same-sex couples in areas unrelated to marriage. In one 
case, Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC,37 the country’s largest adoption website 
prohibited a gay couple in a registered domestic partnership from posting a profile 
as prospective parents, based on a position that “it is in the best interests of infants 
to be placed for adoption with a married mother and father.”38 In a similar vein, 
Catholic Charities of Boston withdrew from providing adoption services, rather 
than continue to permit adoption by gays.39 Refusals by professionals, like 
therapists and doctors, to offer their services to same-sex couples also are employed 
as examples.40 North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. San Diego 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. See, e.g., Katie McDonough, Oregon Baker Denies Lesbian Couple a Wedding 
Cake, SALON (Feb. 4, 2013, 11:55 AM EST), http://www.salon.com/2013/02/04/oregon
_baker_denies_lesbian_couple_a_wedding_cake/; Katie McDonough, Yet Another Bakery 
Refuses to Make Cake for Gay Wedding, SALON (May 15, 2013, 11:51 AM EDT), http://
www.salon.com/2013/05/15/yet_another_bakery_refuses_cake_for_gay_wedding/?utm
_source=feedly; Mark Meredith & Will C. Holden, Cake Shop Says Business Booming Since 
Refusal to Serve Gay Couple, FOX 31 DENVER (July 31, 2012, 8:54 AM), http://kdvr.com
/2012/07/30/denver-cake-shop-refuses-service-to-gay-couple/; Nina Terrero, N.J. Bridal 
Shop Refused to Sell Wedding Dress to Lesbian Bride: Owner Says: “That’s Illegal,” ABC 
NEWS (Aug. 19, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/nj-bridal-shop-refused-sell-wedding-dress
-lesbian/story?id=14342333#.UZqtN7Wkrlw; Wedding Cake Battle Brews Between Couple, 
Baker, KCCI NEWS 8 (Nov. 12, 2011, 9:37 AM CST), http://www.kcci.com/Wedding-Cake
-Battle-Brews-Between-Couple-Baker/-/9357770/7310176/-/fwbjaw/-/index.html.  
 35. Laycock, supra note 7, at 195. 
 36. See Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2001) (finding same-sex couple 
had sufficiently pled that such a policy violated New York City law against sexual 
orientation discrimination). 
 37. 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 38. Id. at 1057. 
 39. See Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, BOS. GLOBE, 
Mar. 11, 2006, at A1. 
 40. See Stern, supra note 7, at 22–24. Several cases involve denial of counseling 
services due to counselors’ religious objections. See, e.g., Walden v. Ctrs. for Disease 
Control & Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2012); Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727 (6th 
Cir. 2012); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011); Bruff v. N. Miss. 
Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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County Superior Court,41 involving a medical practice that refused to perform an 
intrauterine insemination for a lesbian, is often discussed.42  
Although many religious objectors continue to oppose marriage equality 
altogether, when faced with the prospect of its enactment they demand 
accommodation of their religious beliefs. Otherwise, across these three categories, 
objecting individuals and businesses could be exposed to antidiscrimination suits, 
restricted from government funding, or denied tax-exempt status.43  
At this point, it may be helpful to set the limits of the discussion of religious 
accommodation. First, in no instance would legalization of same-sex marriage 
force clergy to officiate weddings of which their religion disapproves or require 
houses of worship to open their doors to such weddings.44 Given the autonomy of 
churches in their internal affairs protected by the Free Exercise Clause, no genuine 
legal dispute exists with regard to churches performing religious marriages.45 
Churches and clergy, therefore, will not be discussed here, although commercial 
actors affiliated with religious organizations will be considered. Second, with the 
issue of religious marriage off the table, it is generally agreed that the First 
Amendment neither prohibits nor requires exemptions to neutral and generally 
applicable laws.46 The debate, therefore, has turned to whether, and how, to craft 
legislative exemptions for those with moral or religious objections.47 It is in this 
context that legal scholars have entered the fray. 
B. Antidiscrimination Exemptions or  
Conscientious Objection as the Legal Framework? 
The scholarly literature reflects a fundamental disagreement over the legal 
framework for accommodating religious objection. Broadly speaking, the debate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).  
 42. See Berg, supra note 7, at 209. 
 43. See Severino, supra note 7, at 957–58 (predicting “punishment for violating 
antidiscrimination laws in employment, housing, public accommodations . . . due to an 
organization following its conscience regarding same-sex marriage”); Berg et al. N.H. Ltr., 
supra note 8, at 3. 
 44. Stern, supra note 7, at 1 (“No one seriously believes that clergy will be forced, or 
even asked, to perform marriages that are anathema to them.”). 
 45. Indeed, in legalizing marriage equality, legislators have reaffirmed their recognition 
of church autonomy in this area. For example, Vermont’s statute stipulates that it “does not 
require a member of the clergy authorized to solemnize a marriage . . . , and any refusal to do 
so shall not create any civil claim or cause of action.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5144(b) 
(2012).  
 46. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990); see also Gillette v. United States, 
401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971) (“Our cases do not at the farthest reach support the proposition that 
a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an objector from any colliding duty fixed by a 
democratic government.”). 
 47. I do not deal here with the application of state and federal Religious Freedom 
Restoration Acts (RFRAs). The federal RFRA does not apply to states, City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and, therefore, like the First Amendment, is not discussed in 
this context. Note also that later-enacted marriage equality or antidiscrimination legislation 
may supersede RFRAs. 
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focuses on antidiscrimination law or conscientious objector protection. With regard 
to race, gender, and most recently sexual orientation, our society has addressed 
conflicts between religion and equality through antidiscrimination law. Here too, 
any accommodation of religious objections would require amendments to laws 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in public 
accommodations, housing, and employment. A group of law and religion scholars, 
however, resists this characterization. They instead adopt the position that marriage 
is an exceptional act, justifying protection of conscientious objection, or so-called 
marriage conscience protection. They attempt to insert marriage into a tradition of 
conscientious objection to war, execution, and abortion. Through scholarship and 
advocacy, they have moved the conscientious objector framework to the forefront 
of debates over religious liberty and marriage equality.  
On the antidiscrimination side, scholars—including William Eskridge, Douglas 
NeJaime, Chai Feldblum, and Taylor Flynn—argue that accommodation of 
religious objections to equality norms has long been analyzed under the rubric of 
antidiscrimination law. As Eskridge says, “There is nothing new about civil 
equality-religious liberty clashes.”48 Historically, as now, religious opposition 
emerged in response to race, religion, or gender nondiscrimination requirements.49 
In particular, outcry around interracial marriage followed a pattern much like that 
of objections to same-sex marriage. Objectors contended that religious beliefs 
specific to marriage—not biases based on status—were at work.50 Moreover, the 
same arguments now made about marriage, which describe marriage as an act 
rather than a status and as a question of liberty rather than equality, were repeatedly 
made against sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws and the decriminalization 
of homosexual sex.51  
Despite attempts to resurrect a distinction between sexual conduct and sexual 
orientation status, religious resistance to same-sex marriage threatens the same 
antidiscrimination norms that religious objections to interracial marriage and sexual 
orientation discrimination laws did. In those states legalizing marriage equality, 
sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws already address those acts that are cited 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, 
Belief, and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REV. 657, 660 (2011). 
 49. See generally id. (noting similarities between these arguments and racial 
discrimination); Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights 
Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781 (2007) (identifying similarities between religious objections to 
gender and sexual orientation antidiscrimination norms). 
 50. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines: Children and Bans on 
Interracial Unions and Same-Sex Marriages, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2736 (2008) 
(“[B]oth antimiscegenation statutes and bans against same-sex marriage have been used to 
construct and reify essentialized and dualistic understandings of race and sex/gender.”); Greg 
Johnson, We’ve Heard This Before: The Legacy of Interracial Marriage Bans and the 
Implications for Today’s Marriage Equality Debates, 34 VT. L. REV. 277, 279 (2009) 
(arguing that cases upholding bans on interracial marriage accepted arguments like those 
against same-sex marriage); Josephine Ross, The Sexualization of Difference: A Comparison 
of Mixed-Race and Same-Gender Marriage, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 255, 256 (2002) 
(arguing that both gay and interracial couples suffered similar sexualization of their 
marriages). 
 51. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 13, at 241; Gilreath, supra note 13, at 207. 
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as examples of religious objections to same-sex marriage. As NeJaime argues, 
“Marriage is merely one form of sexual orientation identity enactment, and 
religious objections to same-sex marriage are merely a subset of objections to 
sexual orientation equality.”52  
Indeed, purported objections to the act of same-sex marriage involve—almost 
exclusively—resistance to sexual orientation nondiscrimination obligations.53 For 
example, the withdrawal of Catholic Charities from adoption services in 
Massachusetts (and calls to exempt adoption providers) stemmed from the 
application of sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws, well before same-sex 
marriage was legalized.54 Claimed rights of employers to refuse gays spousal 
benefits similarly implicate antidiscrimination protections—not marriage per se. 
Any claimed accommodation of such objections thus comes within the purpose, 
structure, and message of antidiscrimination law.55  
Situating the debate within antidiscrimination law does not preclude religious 
exemptions. Across categories of race, sex, religion, and sexual orientation, 
antidiscrimination law has proved capable of balancing interests in religious liberty 
and equality in a nuanced way.  
It should come as no surprise then that a number of scholars embrace both the 
antidiscrimination framework and religious exemptions.56 For example, both 
William Eskridge and Martha Minow urge considering religious exemptions with 
regard to gender and sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws.57 Chai Feldblum 
advocates for exemptions for enterprises that seek to enroll individuals who want to 
be inculcated with antigay beliefs (which could include schools and religious 
camps) and for leadership positions in social services run by religious institutions.58 
Alan Brownstein argues that the example of religious discrimination offers an 
appropriate solution. He proposes that where antidiscrimination law permits 
individuals or, more likely, institutions to discriminate on the basis of religion, so 
too should it exempt them from involvement with or recognition of same-sex 
marriage.59  
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. NeJaime, supra note 13, at 1169. 
 53. See Flynn, supra note 13, at 247; see also NeJaime, supra note 13, at 1179. 
 54. See infra Part IV. 
 55. See generally Angela C. Carmella, Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1731 (2011); Feldblum, supra note 13; Flynn, supra note 13; Lupu & 
Tuttle, supra note 13, at 291–93; NeJaime, supra note 13; Strasser, supra note 13; Gilreath, 
supra note 13. 
 56. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination 
Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 
131–35 (2006); NeJaime, supra note 13, at 1179–80. 
 57. Eskridge, supra note 48, at 715 (endorsing “Martha Minow’s suggestion that the 
gay-friendly state go out of its way to accommodate religion, so long as religion is willing to 
meet the state halfway”); Minow, supra note 49, at 847 (arguing for compromise from civil 
rights advocates to provide religious groups with “avenues for accommodation”). 
 58. Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72 BROOK. 
L. REV. 61, 121–22 (2006). 
 59. Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case for 
Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples to 
Marry, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 389, 425 (2010).  
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On the other side of the debate, Laycock, Wilson, Berg, Stern, Garnett, and 
Esbeck frame the issue in terms of conscientious objection. Some government 
actors and business people, they say, may “feel that they are being asked to 
promote or facilitate sin in a way that makes them personally responsible for the sin 
that ensues.”60 Speaking in one voice in advocacy to state legislators, they assert 
that, “assisting with a marriage ceremony has religious significance that 
commercial services, like serving burgers and driving taxis, simply do not. [Those 
who refuse] have no objection generally to providing services, but they object to 
directly facilitating a marriage.”61 In this sense, objection to same-sex marriage is 
driven, not by the status of the couple as gay, but by objectors’ desire not to 
participate in an act that will threaten their own moral integrity. Same-sex 
marriage, these scholars say, creates “a cruel choice” for religious objectors: “your 
conscience or your livelihood.”62 At stake, says Laycock, is the “religious liberty of 
those religious believers who cannot conscientiously participate in implementing 
the new regime.”63 
Based on this understanding, the Laycock-Wilson group urges the adoption of 
marriage conscience protection (MCP), which treats the refusal to serve same-sex 
couples as “conscientious objection” to the exceptional act of marriage. These 
scholars propose allowing refusal from public employees, religiously affiliated 
organizations, and small secular businesses and individuals engaged in commerce. 
Under MCP, none of these three categories of actors could be “penalized or denied 
benefits under the laws of this state or any subdivision of this state, including but 
not limited to laws regarding employment discrimination, housing, public 
accommodations, licensing, government grants or contracts, or tax-exempt 
status.”64  
First, public employees or officials could refuse to provide marriage-related 
government services.65 Their refusal, however, would be contingent on another 
                                                                                                                 
 
 60. Laycock, supra note 7, at 195. 
 61. Wilson et al. N.Y. Ltr., supra note 8, at 14 (emphasis omitted); see also Severino, 
supra note 7, at 958 (arguing that religious organizations can “live with anti-discrimination 
laws” but not same-sex marriage). 
 62. Wilson et al. N.Y. Ltr., supra note 8, at 13. 
 63. Laycock Conn. Ltr., supra note 8, at 1; see also Berg, supra note 7, at 207 (“It is 
likely in the future that religious dissenters, organizations, and individuals, will more 
frequently face a Hobson’s choice between facilitating same-sex marriages against their 
conscience and giving up their charitable activities or small businesses.”); Wilson et al. Md. 
Ltr., supra note 8, at 9 (“Church-affiliated organizations can have their tax exempt status 
stripped because of their conscientious objection” to offering goods or facilities to same-sex 
couples.). 
 64. Berg et al. Conn. Letter, supra note 8, at 7–8.  
 65. The proposal reads: 
[I]n the case of an individual who is a government employee or official, if 
another government employee or official is not promptly available and willing 
to provide the requested government service without inconvenience or delay; 
provided that no judicial officer authorized to solemnize marriages shall be 
required to solemnize any marriage if to do so would violate the judicial 
officer’s sincerely held religious beliefs.  
Wilson et al. Md. Ltr., supra note 8, at 3–4 (emphasis in original). There is scholarly 
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employee being available to provide the service “without inconvenience or 
delay.”66 Couples initially could be refused a license by a city clerk, but ultimately 
would receive one.  
Second, religious organizations, including commercial actors connected to a 
religious organization, could refuse to solemnize a marriage; to “provide services, 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for a purpose related 
to the solemnization or celebration of any marriage”; and to treat as valid any 
marriage.67 The definition of religious organization sweeps in all commercial 
activity affiliated with a religious group, including landlords, adoption agencies, 
insurance companies, hospitals, and employers. With regard to these religiously 
affiliated businesses, the proposed right to refuse is absolute. Throughout their 
married life, a couple could be denied adoption, social services, housing, and 
spousal leave and benefits. 
Third, individuals and secular businesses could also refuse goods and services. 
While previous proposals would have exempted any business that objects,68 the 
current iteration of MCP applies to businesses (1) where the owner primarily 
performs the services, (2) that employ five or fewer employees, or (3) that own five 
or fewer units of housing for rent.69 Individuals and these small businesses could 
refuse to provide couples with goods and services for weddings, employee benefits 
for spouses, housing, and “counseling or other services that directly facilitate the 
perpetuation of any marriage.”70 The term “facilitate” arguably sweeps in 
businesses and individuals that might be expected to acknowledge a couple’s 
married status or treat same-sex couples equally to opposite-sex couples at any time 
in their married lives. Wilson, for example, suggests carve-outs for state-funded 
adoption placement, spousal leave from employment, and spousal visiting 
privileges at hospitals as potential areas for exemption.71 Under MCP, these 
individuals and businesses may inconvenience and delay same-sex couples, but 
must yield if a party to the marriage is “unable to obtain any similar good or 
services, employment benefits, or housing elsewhere without substantial 
hardship.”72  
The choice then is between MCP’s conscientious objection framework and 
religious accommodation within the antidiscrimination framework. It is precisely 
accommodation in the antidiscrimination framework that MCP proponents resist. It 
therefore is worth noting some ways in which MCP fundamentally diverges from 
                                                                                                                 
disagreement even in the marriage exceptionalism camp regarding this exemption. See, e.g., 
Laycock, supra note 7, at 199 (“Government employees cannot have more than de minimis 
rights to refuse to perform their core job functions for all members of the public, and 
probably most courts would not even concede a de minimis right.”). 
 66. Wilson et al. Md. Ltr., supra note 8, at 3.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Stern, supra note 7, at 308 (admitting that the original proposal “is ambiguous on 
some points,” which raises questions like “are individuals who do business in corporate form 
protected (and, if so, what size corporations would be protected)?”). 
 69. See supra note 10 for proposed statutory text. 
 70. Wilson et al. Md. Ltr., supra note 8, at 3.  
 71. Wilson, supra note 7, at 100. 
 72. Wilson et al. Md. Ltr., supra note 8, at 3. 
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the approach antidiscrimination law has historically taken to balancing equality and 
religious liberty.73  
As an initial matter, the label of conscientious objection focuses on the act of 
marriage itself, not discrimination based on status or other law breaking.74 It cabins 
the debate to the act of same-sex marriage and seeks to avoid comparisons to race 
or sex discrimination. In separate scholarly writing and joint advocacy, MCP 
proponents thus reject the view that objections to marriage are in actuality 
discrimination against same-sex couples.75 They argue that same-sex marriage—in 
contraposition to antidiscrimination obligations—imposes unique burdens on 
public and private actors.76 On this account, religious opponents of same-sex 
marriage are conscientious objectors refusing to cede to legal coercion. Marriage 
becomes an act with great moral peril. By contrast, although antidiscrimination 
laws vary, they share the view of exemptions as authorizing discrimination. 
Objectors do not assert views specific to an exceptional act of marriage; rather, they 
seek to discriminate against couples (or individuals) based on their status.  
This initial difference leads to conclusions about the scope of acceptable 
exemptions. MCP in the model of medical conscientious objection is expansive. 
Due to its focus on marriage as a sui generis act, MCP extends protection across 
contexts and to individuals and institutions, whether secular, religiously affiliated, 
or public. Balancing religion and other societal values becomes irrelevant under the 
MCP analysis. It does not consider intimacy, alternate religious views, or, generally 
speaking, access to services. Unlike antidiscrimination law, MCP does not weigh 
the effect of individual objection on institutional interests. Objecting employees 
would receive a blanket exemption without any consideration of the employer’s 
concerns, as they often do under the medical model from which MCP borrows. 
Large religiously affiliated commercial actors receive carte blanche to discriminate, 
irrespective of any effects on access to services.  
By contrast, exemptions within antidiscrimination legislation—of any kind—
have been relatively narrow.77 Antidiscrimination law also typically does not 
countenance exemptions for secular businesses engaged in commerce and open to 
the public. The rental companies, dress shops, and limo businesses that assert 
objections are prototypical public accommodations, required to serve customers 
and treat employees without discrimination.78 Businesses serving the public and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. See NeJaime, supra note 13, at 1189–95, for a more comprehensive evaluation of 
sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws that MCP would affect. 
 74. See Eskridge, supra note 48, at 662 (observing that litigation seeking exemptions 
from sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws attempted to draw a distinction between 
discrimination based on conduct and status and that “religion-based discrimination against 
African-Americans was premised upon the same kind of thinking”). 
 75. See, e.g., Wilson et al. Md. Ltr., supra note 8, at 15 (arguing that objection “arises 
not from anti-gay animus, but from a sincere religious belief in traditional marriage”). 
 76. See supra note 7 for examples of scholarly writing and note 8 for joint letters. 
 77. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2006) (outlining exemptions within Fair Housing Act). 
 78. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 13, at 238 (noting “the common law’s determination that 
in a clash between a seller’s asserted rights or beliefs and her provision of services to a 
willing buyer, the burden should fall on the seller who has placed herself in the public 
marketplace”).  
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affiliated with religious organizations—like hospitals—also have 
nondiscrimination obligations as public accommodations.79 And public institutions 
must always comply with antidiscrimination obligations.  
Antidiscrimination law also balances a multitude of interests in crafting 
exemptions, including: the private or public character of an entity, the intimacy of 
relationships, the role of religious institutions, and access to commercial 
transactions.80 It evaluates exemptions differently according to the context (housing 
or public accommodation, for example) and the institution involved. Take religious 
individuals. Under antidiscrimination law, clergy (and churches) and public 
employees are easy cases—the private or public nature is determinative.81 A public 
official typically cannot refuse to marry a Jew and a non-Jew, whereas a rabbi 
could so refuse. Religious individuals also are entitled to accommodation from 
their employer, provided it does not create an undue hardship for the employer.82  
Exemptions in the antidiscrimination model are linked to the identity of the 
would-be discriminator and its role in society. Thus, the commercial transactions of 
a business, despite any perceived religious mission, bring it within the rubric of a 
public accommodation subject to antidiscrimination laws.83 Although some statutes 
authorize religiously affiliated nonprofits to discriminate in employment in favor of 
coadherents, they generally do so in a limited way.84 And, to the extent exemptions 
exist for secular businesses, they are not justified by religion but interests in 
intimacy, family life, or practical burden. For instance, the Fair Housing Act 
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. NeJaime, supra note 13, at 1192 (compiling statutes); Kelly Catherine Chapman, 
Note, Gay Rights, the Bible, and Public Accommodations: An Empirical Approach to 
Religious Exemptions for Holdout States, 100 GEO. L.J. 1783, 1789–90 (2012) (“States that 
currently have such statutes generally have minimal religious exemptions . . . . These include 
exemptions for actual places of religious worship, the organizations they operate, and certain 
private organizations.”). 
 80. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (upholding a state 
antidiscrimination law applied to a private organization engaged in “public, quasi-
commercial conduct”); Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, ¶ 16, 61 P.3d 989, 995 
(maintaining that Title VII’s small business exception protects the “intimate relationships 
associated with small employers”); Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. & Marion Morris, Fair 
Housing Legislation, Not an Easy Row to Hoe, 4 CITYSCAPE 21, 25 (1999) (discussing the 
Fair Housing Act’s “Mrs. Murphy” exemption, which exempts individual homeowners with 
four or fewer units who do not use a real estate agent from the law). 
 81. Statutes typically exempt “religious organizations,” defined to include churches, 
synagogues, mosques, and sometimes schools. NeJaime, supra note 13, at 1191–92 & 
nn.74–83. 
 82. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1986).  
 83. See, e.g., Pines v. Tomson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding 
Christian Yellow Pages publisher had business-like attributes and was a public 
accommodation, notwithstanding the fact that it operated under aegis of nonprofit religious 
corporation). 
 84. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2006) (exempting from “a religious corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals 
of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society of its activities”); see also NeJaime, supra 
note 13, at 1191–94. 
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excludes rentals in dwellings with four or fewer units when the owner lives in one 
of the units.85 The concern is for the intimacy of inviting strangers into one’s 
dwelling.86 Similarly, some employment discrimination statutes—including several 
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination87—excuse small businesses (from two 
to fifteen employees) from compliance, in recognition of the cost of litigation and 
potential effect on family businesses.88  
Given these differences, the divide over theoretical frameworks has significant 
practical implications. Whether MCP or antidiscrimination prevails will determine 
whether we view refusals as conscientious objection or discrimination. It will 
influence whether a variety of interests are weighed or marriage is treated as an 
exceptional act. Ultimately, it may determine the survival of a large cross-section of 
antidiscrimination laws.  
II. MEDICINE AS THE MODEL FOR MARRIAGE CONSCIENCE PROTECTION 
Protection of conscientious objection has been limited, historically, to serving as 
a soldier in war, participating in the imposition or execution of the death penalty, 
and, more recently, providing abortions and other controversial medical 
treatments.89 The status of conscientious objector is most closely linked to 
individuals opposed to military service.90 It implies willingness to bear a heavy 
burden, rather than contribute to the law’s immoral project.  
MCP proponents seek to include same-sex marriage within this universe of 
protection of conscientious objection. They rely on the theoretical premise that 
commercial actors’ objections to same-sex marriage are equivalent to doctors’ 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (2006); see also id. § 2000a(b)(1) (exempting lodging for 
transient guests in “an establishment located within a building which contains not more than 
five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such 
establishment as his residence”).  
 86. Rigel C. Oliveri, Discriminatory Housing Advertisements On-Line: Lessons from 
Craigslist, 43 IND. L. REV. 1125, 1135–37 (2010) (discussing origins of the “Mrs. Murphy 
exemption” to the Fair Housing Act and the focus on the intimate, personal nature of living 
side-by-side with boarders). 
 87. See JEROME HUNT, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A STATE-BY-STATE EXAMINATION OF 
NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND POLICIES (2012), available at http://www.american
progress.org/issues/2012/06/pdf/state_nondiscrimination.pdf (listing state sexual orientation 
antidiscrimination statutes and their numerosity requirements, if any). 
 88. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446–47 (2003) 
(observing intent to spare small firms the high cost of compliance); Richard Carlson, The 
Small Firm Exemption and the Single Employer Doctrine in Employment Discrimination 
Law, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1197, 1262–64 (2006) (observing importance of protecting 
personal relations within a small firm). 
 89. Erica J. Sutton & Ross E.G. Upshur, Are There Different Spheres of Conscience?, 
16 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 338, 340 (2010) (“Conscientious objection is the phrase 
that consistently frames the arguments involving health care providers.”). 
 90. A November 1, 2013, Westlaw search of Supreme Court cases returns forty-four 
conscientious objection cases, thirty-six of which involve war or execution, two of which 
involve abortion. A search of courts of appeals decisions also results in almost exclusive 
reference to military service and the death penalty. 
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refusals to perform controversial procedures, abortions in particular. The unique 
structure of medical conscience legislation—which protects medical providers and 
facilities that refuse to provide particular controversial procedures for religious, 
moral, or ethical reasons—then becomes the appropriate practical model for 
marriage. The experience of medical legislation, MCP scholars argue, offers 
relevant and important lessons for the debate over marriage equality. 
Robin Fretwell Wilson, the central proponent of the medical model, says, “It is 
difficult to ignore the parallels emerging between same-sex marriage and the 
recently renewed debates about the limits of conscience in healthcare.”91 Other 
pro-MCP scholars explicitly or implicitly adopt the medical model in their own 
writing.92 Thomas Berg, for example, says that objection to same-sex marriage “fits 
comfortably with the widely accepted ‘conscience clauses’ that protect refusal to 
participate in or directly facilitate an abortion, another specific form of conduct.”93 
Proposing a middle path, Ian Bartrum notes that “we might see the same-sex 
marriage issue as somewhat closer to the controversy over abortion, where we 
exempt service providers with religious objections.”94 Opponents of MCP also have 
been forced to engage with this premise.95  
Wilson and other pro-exemption scholars make three links between same-sex 
marriage and medicine (with a focus on abortion). First and most obviously, like 
abortion, same-sex marriage is politically fraught and evokes religious and moral 
convictions. Second, marriages or weddings, like medical procedures, require 
performance by or involvement of third parties (such as officiants and vendors). 
Conflicts in this area, Wilson says, “parallel the disputes between private 
physicians who do not want to perform abortions, and private patients who want 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. Wilson, supra note 7, at 77. 
 92. Laycock, supra note 7, at 198 (“Robin Wilson proposes what seems to me a much 
more sensible balance: to protect the right of conscientious objectors to refuse to facilitate 
same-sex marriages, except where such a refusal imposes significant hardship on the 
same-sex couple.”); Brownstein, supra note 59, at 414 n.76 (observing that MCP advocates 
“do not necessarily press the healthcare analogy in their work but support essentially the 
same framework”); Geoffrey Trotter, The Right to Decline Performance of Same-Sex Civil 
Marriages: The Duty to Accommodate Public Servants—A Response to Professor Bruce 
MacDougall, 70 SASK. L. REV. 365, 370–75 (2007) (arguing that accommodating objection 
to providing same-sex marriage services “is akin to conscience protections granted to doctors 
and nurses”).  
 93. Berg, supra note 7, at 233; see also Carmella, supra note 55, at 1745–49 
(contending that same-sex marriage exemptions fall within the same framework as abortion 
and contraception); Stern, supra note 7, at 315 (linking abortion and marriage). 
 94. Ian C. Bartrum, Commentary, Same-Sex Marriage in the Heartland: The Case for 
Legislative Minimalism in Crafting Religious Exemptions, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 8, 10 (2009), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/108/bartrum.pdf. 
 95. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 291–93 (arguing that medical conscience 
legislation is not convincing precedent because of the nature of abortion, which involves the 
taking of human life); Strasser, supra note 13, at 11–19, 29–33 (describing and critiquing 
abortion analogy); Robin Fretwell Wilson & Jana Singer, Same-Sex Marriage and 
Conscience Exemptions, 12 ENGAGE 12, 17 (2011), http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20110912
_WilsonSingerEngage12.2.pdf (Singer briefly addressing and rejecting medical provider 
analogy in debate with Wilson). 
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one.”96 On this analysis, religious objectors claim only a negative right to conduct 
business as they see fit, whereas same-sex couples seek a positive entitlement to 
assistance by others.97 Third and most significantly, MCP proponents claim that 
both the medical and marriage contexts involve participation in exceptional acts. 
For a physician, the rationale for objection purportedly is the physician’s 
participation or complicity in a discrete act she judges to be morally bad—not the 
status of the person seeking care. Indeed, medical providers are not privileged to 
deny care to people based on invidious discrimination.98 With regard to marriage, 
florists, bakers, and caterers then can be seen as like the archetypal doctor who 
holds as a moral matter that abortion is killing, an immoral act from which he must 
absolutely abstain. Indeed, Wilson characterizes “the duty not to facilitate 
[marriage as] an absolute” for these objectors.99  
The conscientious objection framework is instrumentally valuable because it 
moves the discussion away from discrimination. By its nature, it focuses on a 
specific act. The contested act, rather than those affected by the invocation of 
conscience, stands at the center of any inquiry. Terming refusal to serve same-sex 
couples “conscientious objection” also attempts to sidestep comparisons to race, 
gender, or miscegenation discrimination.  
The alleged theoretical equivalency between abortion and same-sex marriage 
leads to the Laycock-Wilson group’s legislative proposal. They seek to bring 
marriage under a recognized exception—namely, medical conscience legislation, 
which protects providers who refuse to participate in controversial medical 
procedures. In joint advocacy, they quote at length from medical conscience 
legislation.100 They indicate that federal laws allowing conscientious objections to 
participation in military service and performance of abortions and sterilizations 
constitute precedent for their proposal.101  
Medical conscience statutes were first enacted to ensure medical providers could 
refuse to perform or participate in abortion if it “would be contrary to [their] 
religious beliefs or moral convictions.”102 Later, these statutes extended virtually 
uniformly across states to the withholding and withdrawal of life support.103 The 
stated goal was protecting medical providers’ consciences. In recent years, some 
states have further expanded the reach of conscience legislation to contraception 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. Wilson, supra note 7, at 100. 
 97. See id. at 80; Laycock, supra note 7, at 192 (endorsing this formulation). 
 98. Conscience clauses, however, may be invoked in a discriminatory way (for instance, 
to deny contraception to unmarried women).  
 99. Wilson, supra note 7, at 101 (emphasis in original). 
 100. Wilson et al. Md. Ltr., supra note 8, at 6 n.12. 
 101. Id. at 6. 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (2006) (passed in 1973). 
 103. Martha S. Swartz, “Conscience Clauses” or “Unconscionable Clauses”: Personal 
Beliefs Versus Professional Responsibilities, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 269, 
282–83 (2006); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(b) (LexisNexis 2006) (“No nurse, physician, 
or other health care provider may be required by law or contract in any circumstances to 
participate in the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment if such person 
objects to so doing.”).  
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and fertility care.104 In several states, legislation now applies not only to 
participating in or performing a procedure but also to giving information or 
referring for care.105  
Medical conscience legislation also applies to a wide array of medical facilities. 
Entire hospitals, healthcare systems, clinics, or practice groups may refuse 
contested treatments.106 By contrast to limited exemptions in antidiscrimination 
laws, legislation typically does not differentiate between religious and secular, 
public and private, and for-profit and not-for-profit institutions.107  
This conscience legislation covers three distinct conflicts. First, employers must 
accommodate doctors and nurses who refuse to participate in certain procedures. 
Under pain of civil or criminal penalties,108 employers may not discriminate against 
those who decline to provide certain treatments when making hiring, promotion, 
and firing decisions.109 By contrast, an employer that opposes controversial 
procedures may require doctors and nurses to comply with restrictions on care even 
if they disagree with the employer. Second, providers are immunized from civil or 
criminal liability or professional discipline if they harm patients through their 
refusal.110 Third, the state must accept refusing individuals and institutions into 
government programs and extend funds to them on equal terms to those medical 
providers that deliver all necessary care.111  
The unique scope of conscientious objection protection in medicine makes it an 
appealing model for pro-MCP scholars. Unlike protection of the refusal of a draftee 
to fight in war or a government employee to participate in executions, medical 
                                                                                                                 
 
 104. State Policies in Brief: Refusing to Provide Health Services, GUTTMACHER 
INSTITUTE (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPHS.pdf 
(contraception in 13 states).  
 105. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.31(B) (2008) (extending to refusal to 
“recommend or counsel an abortion”). 
 106. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2154(a) (Supp. 2012); 745 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 70/9 (West 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-7(1) (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-
410 (2011). 
 107. A handful limit institutional conscience clauses to private institutions, ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 20-16-304 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903(4) (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 68-34-104(5) (West 2011). Several others limit institutional conscience protections to 
religious institutions, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-65 (West 2007); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 123420(c) (West 2012). 
 108. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 2012) (violation of 
conscience clause a misdemeanor); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 30/1(c) (West 2010) 
(violation resulting in “civil damages equal to 3 times the amount of proved damages”). 
 109. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-7(c), (e) (2006). 
 110. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(C)(1) (2009) (“[H]ealth care provider is not 
subject to criminal or civil liability or professional discipline for . . . [f]ailing to comply with 
a decision or a direction that violates the provider’s conscience . . . .”); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2A:65A-3 (West 2000) (“The refusal to perform, assist in the performance of, or provide 
abortion services or sterilization procedures shall not constitute grounds for civil or criminal 
liability, disciplinary action or discriminatory treatment.”). 
 111. See 42 U.S.C. §300a-7(b) (2006) (preventing “any court or any public official or 
other public authority” from imposing any requirements to participate in sterilization or 
abortion in violation of religious or moral beliefs). 
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conscience legislation extends to market relationships between businesses and 
consumers, social services and clients, and employers and employees. It gives 
individuals and—in a radical departure from other conscience protection—business 
entities grounds to violate institutional or legal norms without consequence. 
Nowhere else is the burden directly imposed on individuals (patients) and private 
institutions (employers and health facilities), instead of on the state and public at 
large.112 Unlike the draft context, conscientious objectors in healthcare shoulder no 
alternate burdens.113 
The MCP proposal of Wilson, Laycock, Berg, Esbeck, Stern, and Garnett adopts 
this structure, exempting institutions and individuals from requirements usually 
imposed on public accommodations, employers, and landlords. Both public and 
private employers would be required to accommodate individual employees who 
object to same-sex marriage. Religious organizations, small businesses, and 
professionals would be relieved of certain obligations of nondiscrimination and 
would avoid legal liability. Moreover, the state would be prohibited from 
withholding government funding based on their refusal. The burden of MCP would 
fall on same-sex couples and individuals and entities supportive of same-sex 
marriage. 
Marriage conscience protection modeled on medicine has had some traction in 
the political arena. In Iowa, the Religious Conscience Protection Act would have 
allowed individuals and businesses to discriminate against same-sex couples in 
delivering goods and services connected with a same-sex marriage ceremony, 
adoption or reproductive services, spousal benefits, and housing.114 New 
Hampshire legislators proposed amending its marriage equality act to allow any 
business to refuse to provide goods or services to any wedding on grounds of 
conscience.115 In both Maryland and Connecticut, some senators urged the adoption 
of MCP.116  
While no state has enacted the proposal in full, several have adopted narrower 
versions. New York, Vermont, and New Hampshire allow religious entities to 
refuse to provide “services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or 
privileges” relating to the solemnization or celebration of a marriage.117 Beyond the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 112. The burden of objection to the draft falls only indirectly on potential draftees 
through a marginally greater risk of conscription, rather than specific individuals. See 
Geoffrey Stone, Civil Unions: A Response to Garnett and Laycock, UNIV. CHI. LAW SCH. 
FACULTY BLOG (May 5, 2009, 11:29 PM), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2009/05
/civil-unions-a-response-to-garnett-and-laycock.html.  
 113. Cf. Adam J. Kolber, Alternative Burdens on Freedom of Conscience, 47 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 919, 930 (2010); Ronald A. Lindsay, When to Grant Conscientious Objector Status, 
AM. J. BIOETHICS, June 2007, at 25, 25–26. 
 114. H. Study B. 50, 84th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2011). 
 115. Kevin Landrigan, Bill Would Let Wedding Vendors Refuse Service to Engaged 
Same-Sex Couples, NASHUA TELEGRAPH (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.nashuatelegraph.com
/newsstatenewengland/947843-227/bill-lets-some-conscientiously-object-to-gay.html. 
 116. Conn. S. Debate on S.B. 899, 2009 Gen. Assemb. (Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Michael McLachlan); Julie Bolcer, Senate Says Yes to Marry-Land, ADVOCATE.COM (Feb. 
23, 2012, 5:35 PM), http://www.advocate.com/news/daily-news/2012/02/23/senate-says-yes
-marry-land. 
 117. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2012); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-b 
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marriage ceremony, Vermont exempts fraternal organizations from providing 
insurance.118 New Hampshire permits religious organizations and their employees 
to decline to provide “services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or 
privileges . . . related to . . . the promotion of marriage through religious 
counseling, programs, courses, retreats, or housing designated for married 
individuals.”119 Connecticut goes a step further, ensuring that legalization of 
marriage for same-sex couples shall not “affect the manner in which a religious 
organization may provide adoption, foster care or social services if such religious 
organization does not receive state or federal funds for that specific program or 
purpose.”120 In recognizing civil unions, Rhode Island came closest to the MCP 
model. Legislators chose to allow religious organizations, including hospitals, 
schools, and community centers, to refuse to “treat as valid any civil union.”121 The 
exemption stopped short, however, of allowing private individuals or secular 
businesses to object to serving same-sex couples.  
Wilson contends that medical conscience clauses offer a “shining lesson” of a 
“live-and-let-live solution” for the conflict between religious liberty and freedom to 
marry.122 Other MCP advocates agree that exemptions in the medical model would 
defuse much of the controversy.123 They predict MCP would impose only a minor 
burden on same-sex couples.124 
*** 
The remainder of this Article argues that, as a theoretical matter, objections to 
same-sex marriage cannot be justified by reference to conscientious objection 
protections. Moreover, as a policy matter, the experience of medical conscience 
legislation serves not as a shining lesson, but as a cautionary tale. 
III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION PROTECTION 
Our legal system does not support a general proposition that “conscientious 
objection” excuses one from compliance with law. Individuals (and entities) are 
expected to follow the laws of the land or face the consequences. Although 
legislatures and courts often accommodate religious beliefs or practices, they have 
                                                                                                                 
(McKinney, WestlawNext current through L.2013, chs. 1–40); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, 
§ 4502(l) (Supp. 2012).  
 118. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4501(b) (Supp. 2012); tit. 9, § 4502(l); New Hampshire 
included a similar provision. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(IV). (Supp. 2012). 
 119. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(III); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-3-6.1(c)(2) 
(West, WestlawNext current through ch. 534 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (allowing refusals related 
to “the promotion of marriage through any social or religious programs or services, which 
violates the religious doctrine or teachings of religious organization, association or society”). 
 120. CT. STAT. ANN. § 46b-35b (West Supp. 2013); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 517.201(b) (West, WestlawNext current through 2013 Reg. & 1st Spec. Sess.); Act of May 
14, 2013, ch. 74, § 6, 2013 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. (West).  
 121. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-3.1-5 (Supp. 2012).  
 122. See Wilson, supra note 15, at 109. 
 123. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 7, at 198. 
 124. See infra Part V.B. 
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been circumspect in recognizing conscientious objection. This Part discerns why 
legislative protection of conscientious objection has been limited to participation in 
war, execution, and particularly controversial medical procedures. It argues that our 
legal system traditionally has allowed “conscientious objection” only to life or 
death acts for which one clearly can be held responsible.125  
This Part identifies five principles that support legal recognition of 
conscientious objection. These principles distinguish conscience exemptions that 
can be justified from those that cannot, in medicine and beyond. The first three 
undergird conscientious objection in the contexts of war, execution, and abortion. 
As Section A sets out, across philosophical traditions, the necessity and proximity 
of the objector for the alleged bad act and the severity of the consequences of the 
act are central to moral responsibility. As Section B shows, two additional 
principles bolster physicians’ specific claim to act on conscience—the significance 
of ethical and moral reasoning to medicine and the anchoring of claims of 
conscientious objection in shared professional ethics. While any one of these 
principles does not suffice for legislative intervention, the first three seem most 
important.  
Section C argues that long-standing conscientious objection protections with 
regard to medicine, the military, and execution are justified under these principles. 
Traditional “conscientious objections” involve life and death; the claim is to not 
harm another. The law similarly intervenes where the objector bears clear moral 
responsibility for the alleged bad act in terms of both causality and proximity, not 
when she is tangential or remote. In medicine, until recently, legislative protection 
has focused on those objections grounded in professional ethical obligations.  
This Section provides insights into why recent claims to medical conscientious 
objection have been greeted by public resistance and outcry. It enables us to 
distinguish between first-generation conscience legislation, which focuses on 
physicians and nurses and is limited to a narrow range of procedures, and second-
generation clauses, which broaden the actors covered (to ancillary staff like 
pharmacists and paramedics) or loosen the proximity requirements (to referral or 
information). This analysis indicates that the first generation of clauses accurately 
reflects the theoretical foundations of medical conscience. Some recent conscience 
claims in medicine and elsewhere, however, are untethered from them, raising the 
specter of a nation in which each individual’s conscience is king. 
Section D explains that same-sex marriage objections constitute an extreme 
example of claims that lack the distinct and compelling features of conscientious 
objection recognized by law. It examines several categories of objectors, ranging 
from officiants to dressmakers, and marriage counselors to hospital administrators.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. I draw a distinction here between conscientious objection and other religious 
accommodations. As discussed above, the model of conscientious objections has significant 
benefits for MCP proponents that disappear if instead exemption from antidiscrimination law 
is at issue.  
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A. Principles of Moral Responsibility: Severity of Consequences, 
 Necessity, and Proximity 
Traditionally, conscientious objection is only recognized when the objector bears 
clear causal and proximate responsibility for an act with serious consequences, 
typically death. The refusals of the draftee, the executioner, and the doctor have been 
to their own performance of a purported killing. Their involvement is so direct that, 
on one account, the claim is to not commit a wrongful act him- or herself.126 So 
understood, these actors bear little resemblance to same-sex marriage objectors, who 
are not claiming a right not to be married to a person of the same sex.  
Another way to understand conscientious objection, however, is as a claim not to 
participate in another’s wrongdoing. Another seeks to do wrong—to fight an unjust 
war, to execute a prisoner, or to undergo an abortion—and demands the objector’s 
assistance. On this account, the draftee demands not to join the unjust war that is the 
project of the state.127 The healthcare provider seeks to refrain from participating in 
the patient’s project, whether abortion or withdrawal of life support.128 So conceived, 
recognized conscientious objections move closer to same-sex marriage objections.129 
Of course, one does not experience a guilty conscience because another person has 
performed a wrongful act.130 Although one could feel guilt for failing to advise 
against said act, it would be strange to say “my conscience prohibits you from doing 
that act.”131 Instead, each individual experiences conscience in determining the 
morality of his or her own actions.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 126. Judith Lee Kissell, Complicity and Narrative: Insight for the Healthcare Professional, 
1 MED. HEALTHCARE PHIL. 263, 264 (1998) (disputing the characterization of a doctor as 
complicit given “direct control over whether or not the harm finally occurs” and because “what 
the physician does suffices by itself to cause harm”). 
 127. Carl Cohen, Conscientious Objection, 78 ETHICS 269, 271–72 (1968) (defining 
objection as refusal “to co-operate with the state . . . in its war-making activities”). 
 128. Armand H. Matheny Antommaria, Adjudicating Rights or Analyzing Interests: 
Ethicists’ Role in the Debate over Conscience in Clinical Practice, 29 THEORETICAL MED. & 
BIOETHICS 201, 202 (2008) (“[C]linicians’ primary interest is not being complicit in an action 
they consider immoral . . . .”); Joseph Clint Parker, Conscience and Collective Duties: Do 
Medical Professionals Have a Collective Duty to Ensure That Their Profession Provides Non-
discriminatory Access to All Medical Services?, 36 J. MED. & PHIL. 28, 46 (2011) (discussing 
patient as inviting doctor to participate in a collective act); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Some Things 
Ought Never Be Done: Moral Absolutes in Clinical Ethics, 26 THEORETICAL MED. & 
BIOETHICS 469, 481–82 (2005) (conceiving of the performance of an abortion as cooperation). 
 129. See Laycock, supra note 7, at 196 (describing same-sex marriage objections as related 
to “the extent to which one can facilitate, condone, cooperate with, or profit from the 
wrongdoing of others”).  
 130. James F. Childress, Appeals to Conscience, 89 ETHICS 315, 318–19 (1979). 
 131. Jeffrey Blustein, Doing What the Patient Orders: Maintaining Integrity in the Doctor-
Patient Relationship, 7 BIOETHICS 289, 299 (1993) (discussing that conscience only judges self, 
not others); see COMM. ON ETHICS, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. OP. 
385, THE LIMITS OF CONSCIENTIOUS REFUSAL IN REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE 2 (2007) [hereinafter 
ACOG], available at http://www.acog.org/~/media/Committee%20Opinions
/Committee%20on%20Ethics/co385.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20130928T2352471833. 
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That said, people can be held responsible or blamed for their contribution to the 
wrongful acts of others. The key question is thus: “When is one an accomplice in the 
wrongdoing of others and when must one simply accept the fact that all of us are 
morally fallible?”132 A range of philosophical traditions, associated with philosophers 
from Aristotle to Bernard Williams to James Childress, have engaged with this 
question.133 While these traditions are quite complex, we need not explore their 
subtleties, as legislative protection of conscientious objection has only been extended 
where responsibility is evident. This Section draws out factors common across 
traditions. 
Generally speaking, four factors determine whether cooperation with wrongdoing 
is morally justified. The American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics 
summarizes,  
 Whether assisting someone else to perform an act that you consider 
immoral is wrong depends on . . . . a variety of practical considerations 
including the seriousness of the wrong, the causal relationship between 
the assistance and the act, the necessity of the assistance for completing 
the act, and the reason for providing the assistance.134 
These factors inform a variety of perspectives.135 The necessity and proximity of 
one’s assistance to the wrongful act and the seriousness of that act are balanced 
against one’s role and the gravity of one’s reason for cooperation.136 Under this 
                                                                                                                 
 
 132. Daniel P. Sulmasy, What Is Conscience and Why Is Respect for It So Important?, 29 
THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 135, 141 (2008).  
 133. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Societal Duty and Moral Complicity: The Physician’s 
Dilemma of Divided Loyalty, 16 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 371, 371 (1993); see also 
Antommaria, supra note 128, at 206 (“Roman Catholic moral tradition provides the most 
extensive analysis of the concept of cooperation.”); Noam J. Zohar, Co-operation Despite 
Disagreement: From Politics to Healthcare, 17 BIOETHICS 121, 122 (2003) (discussing Jewish 
tradition of ascribing responsibility). 
 134. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Comm. on Bioethics, Policy Statement—Physician Refusal to 
Provide Information or Treatment on the Basis of Claims of Conscience, 124 PEDIATRICS 1689, 
1690 (2009). Although many analyses begin with the question of whether the person shares the 
wrongdoer’s intent and joins fully in his wrongdoing, for objectors across contexts shared 
intent is not at issue. See Kevin Wm. Wildes, Conscience, Referral, and Physician Assisted 
Suicide, 18 J. MED. & PHIL. 323, 325–26 (1993).  
 135. See, e.g., RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, BUSINESS ETHICS 87–106 (3d ed. 1990) (evaluating 
moral responsibility contextually in relation to agent’s action, knowledge, or freedom); Thomas 
M. Jones, Ethical Decision Making by Individuals in Organizations: An Issue-Contingent 
Model, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 366, 374–78, 380, 390–91 (1991) (developing theory that allots 
responsibility according to the severity of the act’s consequences, the certainty the act is moral 
or immoral, degree of complicity in the act, and extent of pressure); Kissell, supra note 126, at 
264 (drawing on casuistic traditions of the common law to understand accountability for 
someone else’s acts); Sulmasy, supra note 132, at 141–42 (reviewing factors from Catholic 
moral philosophy used to determine whether one is an accomplice in wrongdoing). 
 136. James Keenan & Thomas Kopfensteiner, The Principle of Cooperation, HEALTH 
PROGRESS, Apr. 1995, at 23; William Newton, Avoiding Cooperation with Evil: Keeping Your 
Nose Clean in a Dirty World, HOMELITIC & PASTORAL REV. (Sept. 21, 2012), 
http://www.hprweb.com/2012/09/avoiding-cooperation-with-evil-keeping-your-nose-clean-in-
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analysis, people properly may “act for their own legitimate ends, foreseeing but not 
intending that their action will facilitate that wrongdoing.”137  
Our moral intuitions support this construct. The psychological literature confirms 
that we are most likely to assign responsibility to those who are closely connected to 
and the proximate cause of an act with serious consequences.138 Moreover, people 
tend to attribute greater responsibility to cooperation that risks death than they do to 
injury or job termination.139 
The first two factors—necessity and proximity—relate to two dimensions of 
causality, akin to causation in fact and proximate cause. As to necessity, the question 
is, how necessary is one’s participation to the wrongdoer’s act?140 As Daniel Sulmasy 
says, “The more likely that it could occur without one’s cooperation, the more 
justified is one’s cooperation.”141 As to proximity, theories of moral responsibility 
recognize that involvement runs on a “continuum from ‘innocent bystander’ to sole 
cause of the event.”142 Even if one’s act of cooperation could be said to be one in a 
chain of events, it may not be adequately proximate so as to render cooperation 
outside the pale.143 Where the cooperator falls on the causal chain in terms of time, 
space, and intervening events or actors influences the analysis.144 Sulmasy again 
adds, “The further removed one is, the more justified is one’s cooperation.”145  
                                                                                                                 
a-dirty-world/ (balancing “the proportion between the goodness and obligatory character of the 
goal he is pursuing, and the gravity of the evil he is facilitating”). 
 137. M. Cathleen Kaveny, Catholics as Citizens, AMERICA, Nov. 1, 2010, at 12, 13–14. 
 138. See generally F. Fincham & J. Jaspars, Attribution of Responsibility to the Self and 
Others in Children and Adults, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1589 (1979); Lee 
Hamilton, Chains of Command: Responsibility Attribution in Hierarchies, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCH. 118 (1986) (finding that attributions were highest for those who had role responsibility 
and causal responsibility for deaths). 
 139. Thomas M. Jones & Lori Verstegen Ryan, The Link Between Ethical Judgment and 
Action in Organization: A Moral Approbation Approach, 8 ORG. SCI. 663, 671 (1997). 
 140. Pellegrino, supra note 133, at 377–78 (a key consideration is “the extent to which the 
participant’s actions are necessary to, and/or causal of, the harm”). 
 141. Sulmasy, supra note 132, at 141. 
 142. Jones & Ryan, supra note 139, at 672. 
 143. Newton, supra note 136 (“Proximity can make a difference because, the closer the 
action of the cooperator is to the action of the evil-doer, the more the cooperator shares in the 
action of the evil-doer.”); Pellegrino, supra note 133, at 378 (noting that cooperation can be 
justified when “the participant’s actions are not necessary or causal but only remotely 
facilitative”). 
 144. See Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When Should They 
Be Accommodated?, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 47, 61 (2010) (focusing on proximity to 
objectionable act and personal contact and observing “value in the law denying that every 
remote connection really amounts to significant participation”); P. Nortvedt & M. Nordhaug, 
The Principle and Problem of Proximity in Ethics, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 156, 157 (2008) 
(discussing proximity in spatial, temporal, and relational terms); Dennis M. Sullivan & Aaron 
Costerisan, Complicity and Stem Cell Research: Countering the Utilitarian Argument, 24 
ETHICS & MED. 151, 154 (2008) (“[T]he passage of time reduces complicity to a morally 
repugnant act.”); Robert D. Orr, Addressing Issues of Moral Complicity: When? Where? Why? 
and Other Questions, CTR. FOR BIOETHICS & HUM. DIGNITY (May 22, 2003), http://
cbhd.org/content/addressing-issues-moral-complicity-when-where-why-and-other-questions 
(arguing for importance of timing, proximity, and remoteness to material cooperation analysis). 
 145. Sulmasy, supra note 132, at 141. 
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Even if one’s act meets the factors of necessity and proximity, various traditions 
agree that these factors must be balanced against the seriousness of the 
consequences of the wrongdoer’s act. Summarizing the views of many 
philosophers, Velasquez observes that the seriousness of the wrong is the key 
consideration to be weighed against one’s level of involvement and the gravity of 
one’s reason for acting.146 Moral responsibility “will clearly vary according to the 
severity of consequences of the act in question.”147 Note that the seriousness of 
consequences is not self-regarding. Whether objector feels injured himself is 
immaterial; the focus is on harm to other people. 
Proportionality analysis reflects that a person’s responsibility can be reduced by 
the importance of her reason for cooperation. The less serious the harm caused by 
the wrongdoer’s act, the less weighty must the reason for cooperation be.148 
Maintaining good relations with others in one’s profession may provide adequate 
reason.149 Other mitigating factors or excuses, such as duress or legal compliance, 
also may relieve one of responsibility.150  
B. Theoretical Principles Specific to Medicine 
Whereas necessity, proximity, and grave harm ground conscientious objection 
across contexts, medical conscientious objection rests on two additional 
principles—namely, the centrality of moral reasoning to medicine and the 
grounding of objections in professional ethics. These principles bolster physicians’ 
specific claim to act on conscience and further limit conscience protection in the 
medical context.  
1. Medicine as a Conscientious Profession 
A number of scholars identify “professional conscience” informed by moral 
precepts internal to medicine as essential to medical practice.151 To navigate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. MANUEL G. VELASQUEZ, BUSINESS ETHICS: CONCEPTS AND CASES 120–42 (7th ed. 
2011) (summarizing views of many moral philosophers). 
 147. Jones & Ryan, supra note 139, at 671. 
 148. Sulmasy, supra note 132, at 141. 
 149. Joseph Boyle, Radical Moral Disagreement in Contemporary Health Care: A 
Roman Catholic Perspective, 19 J. MED. & PHIL. 183, 198 (1994).  
 150. Antommaria, supra note 128, at 206 (discussing importance of legal requirements to 
analysis); Sulmasy, supra note 132, at 141 (discussing duress). 
 151. William P. Cheshire, Jr., When Conscience Meddles with Ethics, 27 ETHICS & MED. 
139, 139 (2011) (“Conscience is at the heart of the medical profession’s commitment to 
honesty, compassion, and taking responsibility to prevent harm.”); Alan Cribb, Integrity at 
Work: Managing Routine Moral Stress in Professional Roles, 12 NURSING PHIL. 119, 122 
(2011) (“[T]he ethical identity of a practitioner is partly constituted by their membership of a 
professional community . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); David C. Thomasma, Beyond Medical 
Paternalism and Patient Autonomy: A Model of Physician Conscience for the Physician–
Patient Relationship, 98 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 243, 246 (1983) (arguing in favor of 
professional conscience rooted in beneficence and the condition of the patient); see also TOM 
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 33 (7th ed. 2013) 
(arguing conscientiousness “support[s] and promote[s] caring”); James Appleyard, Who 
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ethically complex medical questions, physicians need ethical virtues as much as 
they need clinical skills.152 Through training and socialization, professional ideals 
become integrated with personal ideals, religious and otherwise, that physicians 
and nurses bring to bear when they encounter patients.153  
Across diverse bioethical perspectives, the importance of conscience derives 
from characteristics unique to medicine, including the intimacy of healthcare 
relationships, the shared role in decision making, and, most fundamentally, the 
complexity of moral issues—all of which differentiate medicine from most other 
occupations. Both law and societal expectations treat the practice of medicine as 
not only “a distribution of a commodity” but also “a social good . . . that is 
uniquely defined according to moral relationships.”154 In contrast to commercial 
transactions, relationships in healthcare are intimate and cannot be armslength.155 
Doctors consequently have duties to keep self-interest second to the patient’s 
interests. As Franklin Miller and Howard Brody say, “medical ethics can never be 
reduced to the ethics of marketplace encounters.”156  
The role of physician requires assuming some responsibility for healthcare 
decisions. Studies increasingly find that neither paternalism nor pure patient 
autonomy represents an accurate (or desirable) view of modern medical practice.157 
Decisions about care, instead, are often shared.158 A patient, for better or worse, 
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 152. Piers Benn, Conscience and Health Care Ethics, in PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH CARE 
ETHICS 345, 345 (R.E. Ashcroft et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007); see also Laurence B. McCullough, 
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 153. Edward M. Spencer, Physician’s Conscience and HECs: Friends or Foes?, 10 HEC 
F. 34, 36, 38 (1998); see Vera Dahlqvist, Sture Eriksson, Ann-Louise Glasberg, Elisabeth 
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 154. Matthew K. Wynia, Stephen R. Latham, Audiey C. Kao, Jessica W. Berg & Linda 
L. Emanuel, Medical Professionalism in Society, 341 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 1612, 1612 
(1999). 
 155. Jacob M. Appel, May Doctors Refuse Infertility Treatments to Gay Patients?, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., July–Aug. 2006, at 20, 21 (“The nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship is fundamentally more intimate than the sorts of interactions that occur between 
landlords and tenants or innkeepers and guests.”); Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 471 (2002) (arguing the doctor-patient relationship has a “deeply 
personal type of trust . . . paralleled only in fraternal, family, or love relationships”). 
 156. Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody, Enhancement Technologies and Professional 
Integrity, AM. J. BIOETHICS, May–June 2005, at 15, 16; see also Benn, supra note 152, at 345 
(distinguishing doctor-patient relationship from business-consumer relationship). 
 157. Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics with a Human Face, 69 IND. L.J. 1075 (1994) (arguing 
that the autonomy paradigm is too simplistic an approach). 
 158. Alexander A. Kon, Commentary, The Shared Decision-Making Continuum, 304 
JAMA 903, 903 (2010). 
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cannot choose a particular medical procedure independent of the judgment of a 
professional.159 At minimum, a doctor acts as a “counselor and guide.”160  
The moral complexity of medicine demands of medical providers the ability to 
exercise ethical judgment with sensitivity. Medical decisions often take place under 
conditions of considerable moral uncertainty and high stakes unseen in commercial 
and employment relations. Many involve multiple options with no single correct 
choice.161 “Quality of life,” for example, requires a judgment that may vary 
according to how each person defines a good, or sufficient, life. Indeed, moral 
dilemmas so inhere to healthcare that the nursing literature has developed the term 
“moral distress” to refer to providers feeling torn between their duties and the 
perceived right action.162  
One might challenge the characterization of medicine as a conscientious 
profession with superior entitlements to protection. Alta Charo, for example, rejects 
the view that the role of judgment can explain “why the physician ought to have 
more authority over patient choices than a candy seller has over consumer 
purchases.”163 She argues that, while doctors may refuse to perform procedures, 
they should only do so based on medical inappropriateness, not moral 
approbation.164 By contrast, she says, conscientious objection flies in the face of 
“the prevailing medical ethic . . . of universal care” and may ultimately be 
explained by discrimination.165 As Charo notes, although a physician is expected to 
treat a criminal, one does not hear arguments that, by doing so, he or she becomes 
complicit in the criminal’s immoral acts.166 On this account, physician value 
neutrality should be the goal.  
This point is well taken and may accurately describe some objections. Two 
arguments, nonetheless, indicate that, on balance, medical providers have a 
compelling—which is not to say absolute—claim to act in accordance with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. See Bartmann, supra note 151, at 217 (“A restricted version of the principle of 
patient autonomy could be put like this: The patient has only a veto against any offered 
medical treatment.” (emphasis in original)); Blustein, supra note 131, at 289 (predicting 
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 160. Miller & Brody, supra note 156, at 16; see also Bartmann, supra note 151, at 216 
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 161. Jared R. Adams, Glyn Elwyn & France Légaré, Communicating with Physicians 
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1184, 1184–85. 
 162. Ellen H. Elpern, Barbara Covert & Ruth Kleinpell, Moral Distress of Staff Nurses in 
a Medical Intensive Care Unit, 14 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 523, 523 (2005). 
 163. R. Alta Charo, Health Care Provider Refusals to Treat, Prescribe, Refer or Inform: 
Professionalism and Conscience, ADVANCE, Spring 2007, at 119, 127–28. 
 164. Id. at 128. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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conscience. First, one could contend that “medicine cannot be morally neutral.”167 
Despite the tendency to compartmentalize scientific decisions and moral decisions 
in medicine, the distinction frequently falls apart on closer examination. Even 
questions about the value of new procedures “can be matters of conscience for the 
physician who wants to be a ‘good’ clinician, surgeon, healer, or counselor.”168 
Dr. Kyle Brothers gives the example of the seemingly straightforward clinical 
decision to refuse antibiotics to patients with upper respiratory infections; he points 
out that even such decisions place moral values on possible harms, such as the 
spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria, and possible benefits to patients and the 
public.169 Scientific decisions may not be value neutral. While doctors should never 
impose their own beliefs on patients, a doctor will be called upon to exercise some 
judgment as long as a pure autonomy model does not accurately reflect the reality 
of doctor-patient interaction. 
Second, removing conscience from the medical enterprise could negatively 
affect patients. Nurses, for example, report that acting conscientiously creates 
positive effects, increasing their sensitivity to patient needs and encouraging them 
to perform morally courageous acts.170 As the American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists explains, “conscience, so conceived, . . . has a critical and useful 
place in the practice of medicine. In many cases, it can foster thoughtful, effective, 
and humane care.”171 Although one may be skeptical of the benefits of professional 
conscience to patient care, to the extent it fosters awareness of ethical issues it has 
value.172 As Beauchamp and Childress note, “detached fairness,” which is “suitable 
for some moral relationships, especially those in which persons interact as equals in 
a public context of impersonal justice and institutional constraints” might lead to a 
lack of caring or “uncaring indifference” unsuited to healthcare relationships.173  
                                                                                                                 
 
 167. Cheshire, supra note 151, at 139. 
 168. Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Physician’s Conscience, Conscience Clauses, and 
Religious Belief: A Catholic Perspective, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 221, 230 (2002). 
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 171. ACOG, supra note 131, at 2. 
 172. See generally Douglas B. White & Baruch Brody, Commentary, Would 
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2. Anchoring in Professional Ethics 
In addition to the importance of conscience, the principle that objections remain 
within the bounds of shared professional ethics further distinguishes medicine. As 
leading bioethical accounts agree, physicians’ conscientious judgments must be 
rooted in shared professional norms, if they are to be respected.174 Such norms 
include:  
1) the prevention of disease and injury and promotion and maintenance 
of health; 2) the relief of pain and suffering caused by maladies; 3) the 
care and cure of those with a malady, and the care of those who cannot 
be cured; and 4) the avoidance of premature death and the pursuit of a 
peaceful death.175  
Intertwined with requirements that objections have a basis in professional ethics is 
the importance of the strength of scientific evidence supporting objections.176  
With this limiting principle, conflicts manifest themselves between a patient’s 
values and the values of the profession as a whole, rather than one doctor’s 
values.177 In such cases, the profession has determined that the objected practice is 
ethically (and legally) acceptable for doctors to perform. Simultaneously, the 
professional community has allowed conscientious objection, subject to the ethical 
compromise that physicians inform patients of treatment options, refer for 
treatments they do not provide,178 and do not abandon a patient already under their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 174. See, e.g., HOLLY FERNANDEZ LYNCH, CONFLICTS OF CONSCIENCE IN HEALTH CARE 34 
(2008) (limiting objection to “refusals grounded in values that are widely held within the 
profession and have even been accepted as clinical standards”); Blustein, supra note 131, at 
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 175. Miller & Brody, supra note 156, at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 176. ACOG, supra note 131, at 3–4; Mark R. Wicclair, Reasons and Healthcare 
Professionals’ Claims of Conscience, AM. J. BIOETHICS, June 2007, at 21, 22 (“[I]t is 
warranted to reject claims of conscience if they are based on demonstrably false beliefs.”). 
 177. Angelo E. Volandes & Elmer D. Abbo, Toward a Reconstruction of a Professional 
Medical Morality, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 88, 89. 
 178. Sylvia A. Law, Silent No More: Physicians’ Legal and Ethical Obligations to 
Patients Seeking Abortions, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 279, 303–06 (1994); Ryan E. 
Lawrence & Farr A. Curlin, Physicians’ Beliefs About Conscience in Medicine: A National 
Survey, 84 ACAD. MED. 1276, 1278 (2009) (documenting strong professional ethic of referral 
for services one believes morally wrong). 
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care.179 Carolyn McLeod summarizes the benefits of conscientious objection under 
these conditions:  
First, it helps preserve the integrity of the profession. Second, it helps 
maintain patient trust, since . . . confusion about what norms someone 
will follow can seriously inhibit trust . . . . Third, . . . [p]hysicians have 
agreed to follow the norms of their profession, if only by accepting the 
privileges that go along with membership in the profession.180 
Rooted in professional ethics, claims of conscientious objection, at least until 
recently, have not been anarchic. 
Although traditional objections sound in the language of professional ethics, 
they also undeniably arise most frequently with regard to birth and death, those 
areas most intertwined with religious values.181 The community of coreligionists, 
however, does not suffice to determine the morality of a physician’s actions. Given 
shared ethics, each physician must seek to maintain professional integrity, not only 
personal beliefs.182 One’s fellow physicians serve as a—or perhaps the—referent 
moral community.183  
Admittedly, professional norms have often protected the interests of the 
profession, instead of the public.184 Nonetheless, today our social expectations of 
medical professionals drive compliance with and development of the norms of the 
profession.185 The public demands that physicians care for patients and justify their 
decisions within these ethical boundaries.186  
C. Justifying Legal Protection of Conscientious Objection 
With the principles justifying protection of conscientious objection in mind, this 
Section evaluates conscience claims in medicine and beyond. It relies on bounded, 
neutral principles, not the subjective experience of each objector. These principles 
of necessity, proximity, and gravity of harm prevent opening the door to anarchy. 
When, instead, conscience claims become untethered from these recognized 
                                                                                                                 
 
 179. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 121 (2012). 
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 186. See id. 
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foundations as has occurred in recent expansions of medical conscience legislation, 
they risk destabilizing our legal and medical systems.  
Longstanding conscience protections clearly accord with the elements of moral 
responsibility. The draft, execution, abortion, and end-of-life procedures are linked 
to serious consequences. In each area, the traditional objector’s act—firing a 
weapon, injecting poison, or performing a procedure—has been both proximate and 
necessary. In the medical context, legislators have, at least until recently, reserved 
protections for those objections anchored in the ethical obligations of the profession 
as a whole. Indeed, the involvement is so direct and the harm so grievous in the 
objector’s view that these contexts together might be viewed as sui generis.187  
First, in these areas, conscientious objection operates by reference to an act of 
killing. In the context of the draft, claims of conscientious objection originated in a 
religious “belief that the taking of human life under any circumstance is evil.”188 
Even as it expanded to include objection to particular wars, conscientious objection 
to military service remained linked to the “performance of actions contrary to 
deeply held moral convictions about indiscriminate killing.”189 Refusal to 
participate in the imposition of the death penalty similarly relates to the gravity of 
harm to another. Medical practice also is set apart from other commercial and 
professional pursuits by its life-or-death nature.  
First-generation medical conscience legislation has largely mirrored 
conscientious objection to participation in war or imposition of the death penalty. 
Legislatures have not intervened in every potential conflict of conscience, but 
rather target those circumstances in which medical providers might otherwise be 
called upon to perform an act that results in death or ends the potential for life.190 
For a small subset of physicians, for instance, removal of life support represents 
impermissible harm to a patient to whom one bears specific obligations and is, in 
effect, a killing.191 Some others understand abortion to involve harm to another, in 
effect a killing or taking of potential life. Although people disagree over the moral 
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status of abortion and whether it involves a killing, as Ronald Dworkin long argued 
neither side can treat the other as illegitimate beyond the pale.192 
Debates over the first medical conscience clause—the Church Amendment—
explicitly linked the draft and abortion in terms both of direct involvement and 
killing. Representative Margaret Heckler, for example, argued that “[c]onscientious 
objection to the taking of unborn life deserves as much consideration and respect as 
does conscientious objection to warfare.”193 Throughout the 1970s, Catholic 
conscientious objection to war and to abortion intersected.194 As discussion of 
abortion unfolded in the shadow of the Vietnam War, John Noonan, the leading 
Catholic thinker of the day, opined that “Christian opposition to genocide, to urban 
air raids, to the Vietnam War was no more and no less theological than the 
Christian opposition to abortion.”195  
Today, legislative protection of refusals to perform abortions and end-of-life 
procedures are understood to share these characteristics.196 As Ira Lupu and Robert 
Tuttle observe, “Exemptions from mandatory provision of abortion services, like 
exemptions from conscription in times of war, focus specifically on those who 
might be forced to terminate human life.”197 Indeed, advocates of broader 
protections have been most successful in expanding conscience protection when 
they employ arguments around taking of a life or potential life.198 The severity of 
consequences of the objectionable act has been preeminent. 
Second, even when the harm is severe, the law typically intercedes only if the 
objector is necessary to the alleged wrongful act. The soldier must pull the trigger, 
the executioner must flip the switch, and the doctor must perform the procedure. As 
a matter of moral responsibility, each functions as a primary cause of the ultimate 
act; it could not occur, or would occur only with great difficulty, without his 
involvement. Their roles are not innocent bystanders outside of the causal chain. 
Third, the proximity of one’s involvement has been central to legislative 
protection of conscience. From the time of the Civil War, draftees could assert 
objections to “the bearing of arms” to be assigned noncombatant duties or to pay a 
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fine.199 Federal law excuses objections to participating in an execution or 
prosecuting a capital offence, rather than far-reaching objections.200 
First-generation medical conscience legislation, relating to assisted suicide, 
withholding of life support, and abortion, similarly reflects this principle. Objectors 
are shielded to the extent they directly perform or participate in the performance of 
the alleged bad act. Legislation typically extends to physicians and nurses 
“performing,” “providing,” or “participating in” controversial procedures.201 This 
recognizes the close presence of nurses and doctors to the patient and procedure. A 
nurse assisting a doctor in an abortion may not directly perform the procedure, but 
is exceptionally close and necessary to the act itself.202 Both the act in question and 
the degree of the individual’s involvement influence the success of the claim.203  
Finally, much of the debate over conscience in medicine focuses on objections 
plausibly rooted in the goals of medicine. Take, for example, objections 
surrounding end-of-life treatment. Futile treatment often gives rise to objections, 
with 17.9% of family medicine physicians in one study refusing to provide futile 
care on moral grounds.204 They assert a duty not to “promote the suffering of 
patients by the use of aggressive life-prolonging treatments.”205 Similarly, for some 
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medical providers, abortion constitutes a grievous harm in that it countermands the 
duty to do no harm.206 The anti-abortion stance thus “bears sufficient affinity to 
certain generally accepted core values of medicine,” whereas, for example, the 
withholding of pain relief during labor because the book of Genesis establishes the 
pain of childbirth as Eve’s punishment does not.207  
The defenders of MCP claim objections to same-sex marriage fall within the 
legal tradition of conscientious objection. But the law does not tolerate every 
idiosyncratic objection. It rightly restricts conscientious objection protection to the 
draft, death penalty, abortion, and closely related contexts. Granting legal 
protection in this limited way reflects the reality that all people contribute to 
projects of others that they otherwise oppose. We pay taxes for programs we do not 
support. We compensate people who may use the funds to buy illegal products or 
donate to reprehensible causes.  
By limiting the use of conscientious objection based on its distinct and 
compelling features, our legal system discourages moral rigidity, ensures 
government functioning, and prevents each person from becoming a law unto 
herself. So doing, we recognize that conscience claims far afield from recognized 
moral and ethical foundations may undermine our legal and medical systems to the 
detriment of all. 
With the limitations of life and death, proximity, and necessity, our legal system 
rejects moral rigidity from its citizens. It recognizes that a too rigid position on 
cooperation with immoral activity can only be satisfied by withdrawing from public 
life, denying moral value to engagement in the world.208 By contrast, as Judith 
Kissell argues, drawing lines based on a person’s proximity and necessity to 
wrongdoing “prevent[s] her from spending her time and resources interminably 
protesting wrongdoing in society.”209 They keep her from “abandoning institutions, 
all of which sooner or later violate her principles.”210  
The treatment of conscientious objection in lawsuits and legislation reflects this 
concern. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously declined to grant a 
religious exemption from a required course “in military science and tactics” to 
students at the University of California because of its indirect role in military 
efforts.211 As Justice Cardozo stated in his concurrence, “Never in our history has 
the notion been accepted, or even, it is believed, advanced, that acts thus indirectly 
related to service in the camp or field are so tied to the practice of religion as to be 
exempt, in law or in morals, from regulation by the state.”212 Objectors to the draft 
must perform alternate service to the state, and often the military, even though they 
thereby indirectly contribute to the state’s efforts.213 In peacetime, citizens who 
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disagree with state killing through the death penalty or police use of deadly force 
must continue, through taxes for example, to “support actions of the state’s agents 
through which innocents are left to die or are directly killed.”214 Similarly, although 
it is within the causal chain and may in fact be necessary to the patient securing the 
procedure, referral for a procedure has not usually been considered adequately 
proximate to the act to justify conscientious objector protection. Legislatures have 
not considered translating for patients or transporting them to be so direct as to 
allow participants to “conscientiously object” to performing their jobs.215 The law 
reasonably discourages the scrupulosity of the eggshell conscientious objector. 
From a pragmatic perspective, restricting conscientious objection protection also 
ensures the efficacy of government. For example, when confronting taxpayers’ 
conscientious objection to participating in the Vietnam War through financing, the 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that “the ability of the government to function could be 
impaired or even destroyed” by such claims.216 The importance of ensuring the 
exemptions do not swallow the rule similarly influenced the Supreme Court’s 
rejection of an employer’s challenge to participation in the social security system. 
The Court noted that “[t]o maintain an organized society that guarantees religious 
freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield to 
the common good. Religious beliefs can be accommodated, but there is a point at 
which accommodation would ‘radically restrict the operating latitude of the 
legislature.’”217 The religious and moral pluralism of the United States invites any 
number of potential objections. In the words of the Ninth Circuit, “There are few, if 
any, governmental activities to which some person or group might not object on 
religious grounds.”218 By contrast, the focus of longstanding conscientious 
objection protections on killing suggests that such legislation “reflects the specific 
moral character of the act, rather than a more general deference to the subjective 
demands of conscience.”219  
This analysis suggests that more expansive medical conscience legislation 
cannot be justified as analogous to objection to war or abortion. It does not share 
the key characteristics of traditional conscience protections. Some legislation now 
concerns procedures far removed from death or permanent injury, like assisted 
reproduction.220 A few encompass individuals distant in time, locale, and 
association from the alleged bad act, such as a surgical aide instructed to clean 
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instruments used in abortions.221 Such individuals do not play the role of counselor 
and only become involved after the patient and physician have made a decision. 
Others, such as pharmacists, are not privy to relevant information. Their 
involvement is often mediate and remote, rather than immediate and proximate.222 
As bioethicist Ronald Lindsay notes, “The notion that such healthcare workers are 
responsible for the healthcare decisions of others is untenable . . . .”223 Finally, 
three states broadly allow medical providers to decline to participate in, refer for, or 
give information about any healthcare service—a far cry from what professional 
ethics support.224  
Ultimately, conscience claims unjustified by accepted and limited moral 
foundations invite “conscience creep” in which all resistance to regulation becomes 
acceptable.225 They allow anarchy, where any individual can win exemption free of 
the weighty bases demanded for military, death penalty, and medical objections. In 
the words of the Supreme Court, they “would . . . make the professed doctrines of 
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect . . . permit every citizen 
to become a law unto himself.”226 Such unjustified claims devalue the meaning of 
conscientious objection itself. They seek to overturn a system that acknowledges 
that although the law—like conscience—can be wrong, each citizen is obliged to 
obey it so long as “one sincerely and conscientiously thinks that his society, on 
balance, is a just one.”227  
The principles here explain why proponents of conscience legislation have been 
less successful with this more expansive legislation than they have with abortion 
and end-of-life treatments. These principles allow us to more rigorously scrutinize 
future claims of conscience in medicine and, now, in response to same-sex 
marriage. 
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D. Unjustified Conscientious Objection to Same-Sex Marriage 
Claims of conscientious objection to same-sex marriage lie far afield from the 
distinct and compelling features of conscientious objection traditionally recognized 
by law. Objections to same-sex marriage do not implicate life and death. Although 
marriage objectors claim that their involvement renders them morally responsible 
for the act of same-sex marriage to a degree they cannot live with, their 
involvement is generally not necessary or proximate to the marriage. Providing 
goods, benefits, and services as one normally does lacks the moral complexity of 
medicine. Nor typically does objection occur in an environment of professional 
ethical constraints.  
To spin out this thesis, this Section applies these principles along several 
categories of objectors from officiants to dressmakers, and marriage counselors to 
hospital administrators. MCP would cover them broadly, encompassing recognition 
of couples’ married status for purposes of benefits or services and “facilitation” of 
the perpetuation of marriage through the delivery of services. Although this Section 
concentrates on individual objectors, reserving for the next Part the particular 
problems of institutional objections, it addresses the objection to recognizing or 
facilitating the perpetuation of same-sex marriage more generally. 
First and most obviously, objectors to same-sex marriage cannot identify a harm 
equivalent to the military or medical contexts. At most, they might claim some 
diffuse harm to the institution of marriage.228 The fact that marriage, as opposed to 
death or bodily harm, is the ultimate consequence indicates that cooperation might 
be justified by the proportionate reason of continuing in one’s profession or acting 
as a law-abiding citizen.229 Legal duties of nondiscrimination would further 
mitigate the cooperator’s responsibility.230 
Second, by and large, the same-sex marriage context lacks the moral complexity 
and connection to shared ethics that medical conscientious objection requires. The 
standard bearers of marriage objection—photographers, florists, and landlords—
operate as they ordinarily do and do not base their objections in any shared ethics 
(nor indeed do their occupations have such commitments). For such objectors, it is 
virtually impossible to think of what might substitute for ethical duties like “do no 
harm” or “relieve suffering.” To the extent that one could imagine duties, like “sell 
only quality products,” they bear no relevance to marriage. 
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That said, because MCP applies to all individuals, some objectors could belong 
to professions characterized by moral complexity and shared ethics (including 
medicine). The requirement that objections originate in professional ethics 
themselves, however, seems absent from the marriage context. Whereas doctors 
cite their obligation to preserve life to refuse assisted suicide, those who decline to 
perform IVF for lesbian couples cannot anchor their refusal in professional ethics. 
Notwithstanding physicians’ ability to choose their patients, such refusals of care 
cannot be framed as a requirement of professional ethics. Indeed, medical ethics 
prohibit such acts as impermissible discrimination.231 Similarly, if a tax or family 
law attorney objected to serving gay married couples, he or she would be hard 
pressed to identify the ethical norm supporting the objection.  
Third and most significantly, virtually all objections to marriage founder on the 
requirements of causal and proximate responsibility for the act of marriage. MCP 
covers objections that run from after-the-fact recognition to observation to 
performance. Laycock himself admits that many are “transactions well removed 
from the wedding and not involving explicit reference to the marriage.”232 
Undoubtedly, some same-sex marriage objectors removed in time and space with 
little to no causal connection to the wedding will believe they bear moral 
responsibility for the marriage. Nonetheless, their objections do not satisfy the 
bases for conscientious objection. 
Again, retailers providing goods and services for the solemnization and 
celebration of a wedding prove easy cases. Cake, music, and flowers undoubtedly 
enhance a wedding celebration, but they are not necessary either to it or to the 
marriage. Unlike the medical context, the involvement of objecting vendors cannot 
be said to have caused the marriage in any way. A couple could wed with or 
without floral arrangements. Although such retailers may be proximate in time and 
space (a photographer, for instance, will be at the ceremony), they lack any 
causative role. To the degree they are involved, their participation is analogous to 
that of a bystander.  
Other retail services may be in the causal chain but quite remote. Consider the 
limo company that transports one of the fiancés to the wedding or the venue that 
rents the couple an event space. Both may be necessary to the occurrence of the 
marriage. Their participation, however, is attenuated. It does not suffice for the 
marriage to occur and is mediated by multiple intervening actors, including the 
officiant and the couple themselves. To return momentarily to the medical analogy, 
such cooperation is even less direct and more remote than referral for or 
information about an abortion—neither of which is typically excused as 
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conscientious objection.233 These vendors’ involvement in the marriage approaches 
that of store clerks in over-the-counter sales of emergency contraception, which is 
so attenuated as to “preclude[] justifiable claims that such participation amounts to 
immoral cooperation.”234  
After the wedding celebration, MCP extends to a number of situations that are 
remote from and without any causal link to the marriage. These include allowing 
religiously affiliated businesses to refuse to treat a marriage as valid, presumably 
for housing, benefits, visitation, etc., and small secular businesses and individuals 
to deny married couples spousal benefits and rental housing. If the wedding is 
analogized to the event of the contested medical procedure, the ongoing status of 
married is akin to treating a person differently for the entirety of their lives based 
on whether they had received an abortion, emergency contraception, or other 
contested service—claims not permitted under traditional conscientious objection 
law.  
One could argue that benefits, recognition, and access to housing constitute 
incentives to marry. The connection, however, is both remote and unlikely to lead 
to any specific marriage. By the time these entities encounter the couple, the 
marriage is a fait accompli. Denying a couple equal treatment decades after their 
marriage will not undo it.  
 Nor can any endorsement of the specific marriage be implied, because the 
cooperator’s act (baking cake or providing health insurance) is distinct from the act 
of the “wrongdoer” and is not itself wrong. Presumably, the objectors have good 
reason to believe that their normal engagement in their occupation is morally 
sound. The fact that their activity relates to a gay marriage does not change its 
moral character. For those retailers in the causal chain, the act of cooperation is not 
unlike the centuries-old example of the servant carrying a letter to his master’s 
lover, which is “morally indifferent and not like the object of his master’s illicit 
action, that is, adultery.”235 Given the attenuated nature of involvement, with regard 
to benefits, for example, courts have reasoned that requiring recipients of city funds 
to extend the same health and fringe benefits to employees with domestic partners 
as to employees with spouses does not demand they endorse those relationships.236  
Individual counselors and others who “directly facilitate the perpetuation of any 
marriage,”237 as MCP calls it, at first glance appear to be closer cases. Like medicine, 
counseling requires intimacy and subjects therapists to ethical constraints. Counselors 
also have a more robust claim to proximity and perhaps causation. The couple likely 
intends it to foster, if not cause, the survival of their relationship.  
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Nonetheless, the causal link is anemic. The counselor does not perform the 
marriage nor is she necessary to it. Moreover, MCP presumes the couple will 
already be wed, such that the counseling will be remote in time and space from the 
marriage. The counselor’s participation does not suffice either for the existence or 
perpetuation of the marriage. Finally, professional ethics require counselors and 
social workers to be nondirective.238 Unlike doctors, they need not act in a client’s 
best interest or share decisions; “[t]heir dilemma may be eased in that, being 
nondirective, they have no complicity in what they believe to be patients’ moral 
errors.”239 
Granting a license and officiating a marriage come closer to the direct and 
proximate involvement exempted by medical conscience clauses. Both are central 
to the marriage, and the officiant is as proximate as a cooperator could possibly be 
to the act. That these are the only objections that overlap with any principles 
underlying traditional conscientious objection regimes helps explain why 
legislators have been most receptive to these objections. They have often carved 
out exemptions for individuals who might have to perform marriages to which they 
object.240 Indeed, as Lupu and Tuttle indicate, if MCP proponents limited their 
advocacy to solemnization of a same-sex marriage, the abortion analogy might 
become stronger.241 Note, however, that the objection still lacks the serious 
consequences that underpin the abortion context. 
Marriage conscience protection radically departs from the limiting principles 
that serve as the foundation of conscientious objector protection in medicine and 
the military. It shares little in common with our nation’s tradition of protecting 
conscientious objection. Instead, it seeks to excuse from compliance with the law 
objectors who play little to no causal role in the alleged wrongdoing, are often 
distant from it, and operate in a context where any harm to others is theoretical, 
rather than potentially fatal. 
IV. MEDICINE AS A FLAWED MODEL FOR SAFEGUARDING CONSCIENCE 
The analogy to conscientious objection in the medical model is inapt, and 
accommodation under antidiscrimination law traditionally rejects the broad and 
absolute exemptions sought here. Still, one might argue that religious freedom is a 
superior value to equality and that, even if objections do not rise to the level of 
conscientious objection, wide-ranging exemptions should be enacted to protect 
religious freedom.  
Marriage conscience protection in the medical model, however, would not only 
fail to protect but actively undermine religious freedom. As this Part shows, MCP 
replicates two major flaws of the medical model to the detriment of conscience.242 
First, as Section A demonstrates, protecting institutional interest in the name of 
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corporate conscience is at odds with the exercise of individual conscience. 
Authorizing a business to demand that its employees adhere to a moral perspective 
quashes their ability to live out their own convictions. As Section B discusses, 
recognizing this inherent tension unearths a second, related problem: conscience 
protection in the medical model takes a one-sided view of religion and morality. 
People of conscience and institutions on the pro-marriage-equality side of the moral 
divide go unnoticed, even as marriage conscience protection imposes significant 
burdens on them.  
A. Tension Between Individual Conscience and Corporate Interest 
The most radical aspect of marriage conscience protection lies in its extension to 
claims of conscience by secular and religiously affiliated businesses engaged in 
commerce, allowing them to avoid their nondiscrimination obligations. In so doing, 
MCP relies on the assumption that artificial, legal entities have and experience 
something like the individual human’s capacity for conscience. Yet, its proponents 
have failed to offer a robust theoretical defense of institutional conscience or to 
consider the implications of prioritizing institutional interest for individual 
conscience.  
The concept of conscience for artificial entities is more difficult than MCP 
proponents acknowledge. Conscience is a distinctly human capacity generally 
referring to our “human knowledge of right and wrong, and thus encompasses our 
moral consciousness, process of moral decision making, and settled moral 
judgments or decisions.”243 Corporations lack these distinctly human 
characteristics. Whereas an individual makes conscientious judgments that define 
“the central moral core of her character,”244 corporations are defined by a profit 
motive that is so detached from moral reasoning that discussion still proceeds as to 
whether businesses are morally responsible for their actions—let alone entitled to 
moral rights.245 
Although, as I have argued elsewhere, discussing institutional interests in terms 
of “conscience” is not theoretically convincing,246 institutional interests may lie in 
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the value of allowing individuals to associate with one another. When and how 
these interests should overcome individual conscience, however, is vigorously 
contested.247 One need not settle this debate to appreciate that the institutional 
interest, whatever it may be, inherently stands in tension with the individual 
exercise of conscience.  
Take the religious organizations that the MCP proposal would cover. These 
include universities, hospitals, social services, daycare centers, and adoption 
agencies, many of which are large employers and service providers. For example, 
religious hospitals, which could deny couples visitation under MCP, account for 
approximately one in five hospital beds in the United States.248 Catholic hospitals 
alone employ nearly 800,000 people.249 MCP would free these powerful 
institutions to discriminate in employment, housing, admissions, and provision of 
goods and services to the public.  
Because organizations are rarely monolithic, protecting institutional positions on 
moral issues means imposing them on individual humans (be they consumers or 
employees). Individuals often become associated with employers or vendors for 
reasons other than shared moral positions. One cannot assume they all share moral 
convictions and that institutional policy reflects each individual. In large 
organizations, in particular, individuals hold a plurality of beliefs. 
The experience of Catholic Charities of Boston, which is often invoked by MCP 
proponents, provides a case in point.250 Over two decades, under a contract with the 
state foster system, Catholic Charities placed 720 children, thirteen of them with 
gay foster parents.251 After a journalist revealed these adoptions had taken place, 
the board of Catholic Charities unanimously affirmed its commitment to continuing 
such adoptions.252 The bishops subsequently overturned the decision, prompting 
seven board members to resign in protest.253 Among them was board chairman and 
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devout Catholic, Peter Meade, who stated that his conscience prevented him from 
endorsing a morally wrong policy of discrimination.254 
As this example shows, even when individuals within an organization concur on 
general principles, disagreement may emerge in concrete circumstances. For the 
board members, the central moral goal of Catholic Charities was helping children 
in need. To the extent disapproval of certain family structures was a commitment, it 
could cede to the primary aim.255 The bishops, however, disagreed, and—in this 
case—their views prevailed. In other religious organizations, the moral beliefs of 
administrators, board members, or employees might determine the course of the 
organization. In any case, allowing one group to represent the “conscience” of the 
organization suggests only some individuals’ moral convictions count.  
Disjunction between individual convictions seems particularly likely in the 
religiously affiliated businesses and secular employers that are at the heart of the 
MCP proposal. Most commercial providers—religiously affiliated or not—will be 
unlikely to send a clear anti–marriage equality message to potential employees, 
associates, and customers. The central moral goal (and message) of many religious 
organizations will be delivering services, whether to the needy as charitable 
mission or to paying customers as revenue generation. It would be difficult to 
categorize the message of the nursing homes, clinics, food banks, shelters, 
universities, and commercial entities associated with religious groups as anti-same-
sex marriage.  
Of course, some organizations do unite employees and customers who share 
particular values. One of the most compelling arguments for protecting the 
institutional interest of medical facilities lies in the value some patients ascribe to 
religiously sensitive care. In the vulnerable state of illness, infirmity, or dying, 
some patients will want to be treated within facilities that reflect their religious or 
moral values.256 Likewise, in some subcategory of religious organizations, like-
minded adherents might associate around an anti–marriage equality message. One 
could imagine small schools, summer camps, or marriage counseling centers 
devoted to religious doctrine that manifest these attributes. At best, however, the 
existence of such entities counsels toward accommodating organizations with a 
religious mission that primarily serve and employ coadherents in the model of 
antidiscrimination law.257  
What about secular small businesses covered by marriage conscience 
protection? Smaller businesses may bring together employees who share 
convictions and seek to carry them out in the workplace. They may involve closer 
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(and sometimes family) relationships between employer and employees. For a few 
businesses, a generalized position on moral issues may be clear to potential 
employees and customers. A bookstore that only sells evangelical literature is more 
likely to attract evangelicals as employees and consumers.  
Nonetheless, small secular businesses also involve people—consumers, 
employees, or owners—who could be expected to disagree over moral issues. Few 
attract employees and customers with their moral message. As a general rule, 
commercial businesses open to the public to deliver flowers or bake wedding cakes 
select employees based on their skills and experience, not their religious training. 
Customers typically choose to contract for these goods based on quality, not 
similarity between the owner’s moral code and their own.  
As is commonly recognized in antidiscrimination doctrine, the profit motive 
makes any moral mission secondary at best.258 Indeed, when the basic business 
model is, for example, a bakery, a message of rejection of “same-sex marriage” 
may be lost to the consumer altogether. This is especially likely here because, 
according to MCP proponents, the business would be required to serve gays 
without discrimination, unless they were engaged or married.259 
Ultimately, protecting institutional interest, whether of large religious 
organizations or small secular businesses, risks undermining the consciences of 
employees and consumers. It relies on the shaky supposition that corporations have 
consciences to set up a regime that inherently conflicts with the exercise of 
individual conscience. The asserted interest in religious freedom works to suppress 
the religious freedom of individuals within these institutions and, as we shall see, of 
organizations committed to same-sex marriage as a moral or religious matter. 
B. Undermining Conscience on the Pro–Marriage Equality Side 
The MCP proposal reproduces a second flaw of medical conscience 
legislation—its failure to grant that conscience exists on both sides of the moral 
divide. Medical conscience legislation safeguards a single moral position in the 
abortion (or end-of-life) debates. How providers will be treated depends entirely on 
the content of their consciences, not on the sincerity or depth of their commitment 
to the conscientious position. Yet, conscience equally may compel providers to 
deliver a controversial treatment to a patient in need.260  
Nor does the medical legislation acknowledge the interests of institutions 
committed to performing controversial procedures (like Planned Parenthood). They 
must accommodate individuals who violate institutional norms by refusing to 
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perform such procedures. By contrast, when an institution refuses to deliver legal, 
necessary care, the law does recognize a concept of “institutional conscience.”261 
These asymmetries render the legislation both ineffective and incoherent; it 
sporadically protects conscience and simultaneously sets up new conflicts of 
conscience.  
Marriage conscience protection would replicate these asymmetries. In every 
workplace that accepts same-sex marriage as moral, individuals who reject it may 
defy institutional commitments. Religious organizations and businesses of all sizes 
that support gay rights would be required to accommodate dissenting individuals. 
By contrast, at least in small and religiously affiliated businesses, individuals who 
believe same-sex marriage to be morally permissible or required would have to 
comply with employers’ policies of refusal. And entities that reject gay rights 
would be free to hire and fire employees who refuse to follow their policies. 
Compare two cases sometimes criticized by exemption proponents as typical of 
the problems faced by religious objectors (although both concern employment 
discrimination, rather than marriage).262 In the first, Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard 
Co.,263 an employee of Hewlett-Packard (HP) was dismissed for repeatedly 
violating the company’s harassment policy. After HP displayed posters—one of 
which featured a gay employee—for its diversity campaign, Peterson posted 
scriptural passages calling for death for a man who lies with mankind, due to what 
he described as a religious duty “to expose evil when confronted with sin.”264 The 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that HP was required to accommodate 
Peterson, but he had repeatedly rebuffed its attempts to do so. The court rejected 
the view that Peterson’s proposals, which would either allow him to continue to 
harass his fellow employees or exclude sexual orientation from the diversity 
program, were reasonable.265 The logic of marriage conscience protection (putting 
aside the size limitation in the current version of the proposal) would demand the 
opposite result, resolving the employer-employee conflict in Peterson’s favor. 
The second case, State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc.,266 flips 
the roles of employer-employee. A chain of for-profit sports clubs argued that the 
owners’ religious beliefs required discriminatory employment practices. It cited 
biblical prohibitions on working with “unbelievers” as support for restricting 
managerial positions to Christians and refusing to hire devout non-Christians.267 
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the club’s defense. This time, the approach 
of marriage conscience protection would suggest that the business, unlike HP, 
should have been permitted to maintain its identity and impose institutional norms 
on employees and applicants.268 
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As these cases show, the approach taken by MCP advocates would not 
consistently protect either individual conscience or institutional interest. The 
consciences of individuals whose moral or religious beliefs support same-sex 
marriage fall by the wayside. Under MCP, refusing businesses could demand that 
their employees, irrespective of their conscientious beliefs, refuse services, goods, 
or recognition of status to same-sex couples. If, however, allowing individuals to 
follow their consciences in commercial activity is an interest worth preserving, it is 
unclear why individual conscience should not be prioritized uniformly. Shouldn’t 
employees who support same-sex marriage based on their moral convictions be 
entitled to accommodation by objecting employers?  
Likewise, under MCP, the interests of a pro–gay rights company in setting 
policy or bringing together like-minded individuals would be rendered null. Despite 
their commitments, employers—including religiously affiliated organizations—
would be prevented from discriminating against objectors to same-sex marriage 
and could not refuse to serve them, provide them spousal benefits, or acknowledge 
their marriages as valid. The individual objector could interfere with the 
institutional position—or the company’s very ability to comply with the law. This 
is in sharp contrast to the deference to “institutional conscience” that MCP grants 
similarly situated objecting institutions.  
The MCP proposal thus would generate new conflicts between commercial 
interest and human conscience, even as it resolves others. For example, an 
employer’s instructions to deny services to gay couples might cause a crisis of 
conscience for an employee deeply committed to equality. This moral precept could 
be founded in religious conviction, even the biblical injunction to “love your 
neighbor as yourself.” Turning the couple away could be expected to result in a 
guilty conscience. Violating the employer’s policy, on the other hand, might cause 
the employee to lose her job.  
As with abortion, the asymmetries flow from a cramped vision of conscience. 
The very framing of refusal as “conscientious objection” turns a blind eye to the 
range of conscientious positions. It seeks to establish opposition to same-sex 
marriage as the religious or moral position.  
With regard to same-sex marriage, moral and religious beliefs in the United 
States are far more varied—and increasingly more supportive of such marriages—
than the MCP proposal acknowledges. The very presentation of the issue of 
same-sex marriage as “Gay Rights versus Religious Freedom,” as Flynn argues, 
“ignores that many religious faiths support same-sex marriage as a matter of 
theology [and] that many gay people are members of religious faiths.”269 Consider, 
for example, the ministers who faced criminal charges for conducting same-sex 
marriages or the public officials who granted marriage licenses because they 
determined it to be right.270 As law and society have come to recognize the rights of 
gays, religious doctrine has followed, with many religious groups growing more 
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accepting of gays.271 Given a plurality of religious beliefs, protecting conscience 
may not support exemptions in the way MCP proponents assume.  
V. POLICY LESSONS FROM MEDICINE 
MCP proponents claim that the medical model offers an effective way to reduce 
conflict in the marketplace and public life. Authorizing conscientious objections, 
they predict, will have little effect on gay couples. Few objectors will take 
advantage of marriage conscience protection and those who do will eventually 
leave the market.  
This Part argues that the experience of conscience legislation in medicine 
suggests these salutary effects may not be forthcoming. As Sections A and B show, 
one could equally anticipate that MCP will prolong strife and impose hefty burdens 
on same-sex couples.  
A. Conflict Reduction Rationale 
A benefit of MCP, proponents claim, is its ability to defuse conflict. Laycock, 
for instance, forewarns that “[r]efusing exemptions to such religious dissenters will 
politically empower the most demagogic opponents of same-sex marriage. It will 
ensure that the issue remains alive, bitter, and deeply divisive.”272 He predicts, 
“[p]ut religious exemptions in the bill, and at a stroke, you take away one of the 
opponents’ strongest arguments.”273 What follows is the good-for-gays argument 
that MCP will not only reduce civil strife, but also lead to more rapid acceptance of 
gay families.274 In short order, MCP advocates say, exemptions will become 
unnecessary.275  
Two objections come to mind. First and most obviously, any increased 
acceptance of gay families would result not from religious exemptions, but from 
marriage equality itself. In Massachusetts and Iowa, public opposition dropped 
quickly following court decisions in favor of marriage equality.276 Contrary to 
predictions, a flood of objections did not result nor did the debate grow more 
heated.277  
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Second, the medical model suggests that exemptions, in and of themselves, do 
not reduce conflict. The abortion debate cannot be said to have dissipated. Nor, 
indeed, has conscience legislation resolved clashes between patients, providers, 
and institutions. Today, one in five doctors in a religiously affiliated health 
facility reports experiencing conflicts between religious restrictions and their 
duties to their patients.278 As one might expect, obstetrician-gynecologists 
experience even higher rates of conflict.279 Patients and providers frequently 
organize against hospital mergers that threaten access to reproductive and end-of-
life care.280 In several states, medical associations also have lobbied against wide-
ranging conscience bills.281 In others, challenges have been mounted against 
conscience clauses that impede healthcare.282  
Over time, conscience legislation may have simply shifted litigation. 
Today, it is refusing healthcare providers and auxiliary staff, like paramedics, 
who sue their employers.283 The volume of litigation, as with willing 
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providers,284 remains small, likely because healthcare facilities tend to resolve 
conflicts through internal processes.285  
Granting a conscience exemption may not only shift conflicts, but also intensify 
future claims to exemptions.286 In the medical arena, the past fifteen years have 
seen ever-more vociferous demands from objectors. Pharmacist conscience 
legislation, once unheard of, has spread.287 In some states, payers, such as 
employers and insurance companies, have successfully attained the ability to 
impose moral beliefs on insureds.288 Most recently, the Affordable Care Act’s 
requirement that insurance plans cover contraception has provoked claims of 
conscientious objection from businesses ranging from Catholic-affiliated hospitals 
to for-profit construction companies.289 
One might reasonably suggest that abortion is and will remain more fraught than 
same-sex marriage. Certainly, the rapid rise in public support for marriage equality 
seems to indicate so. That said, in the 1960s and 1970s, public opinion also steadily 
increased to favor legal abortion.290 As is relevant to marriage equality, increasing 
                                                                                                                 
St. John’s Lutheran Hosp., 597 P.2d 702 (Mont. 1979); Larson v. Albany Med. Ctr., 676 
N.Y.S.2d 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); see also Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: 
Conscience Clauses and Conscientious Refusal, 21 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 163, 166 (2010) 
(reporting a 2005 Louisiana case denying summary judgment to a hospital that fired a nurse 
who refused to administer emergency contraception); Seth Augenstein, Nurses’ Abortion 
Suit Asks: At What Point Is Assisting Facilitating? RNs at UMDNJ Objected to Taking Part 
in Procedure, STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 15, 2011, at 025; Gallagher, supra note 221. 
 284. See, e.g., Doe v. Ceci, 517 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1975) (requiring county hospitals to 
make facilities available to doctors to perform abortions); Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph 
of Peace, 506 F.2d 308, 310–12 (9th Cir. 1974) (documenting several actions to compel 
denominational hospitals to perform tubal ligations); McCabe v. Nassau Cnty. Med. Ctr., 
453 F.2d 698, 702 n.7 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting three similar lawsuits in New York); Taylor v. 
St. Vincent’s Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948, 949 (D. Mont. 1973) (regarding tubal ligation). 
 285. See Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 223 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting 
hospital repeatedly offered other positions to a labor and delivery nurse); Grant v. Fairview 
Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., No. Civ. 02-4232JNEJGL, 2004 WL 326694, at *1 (D. Minn. 
Feb. 18, 2004) (discussing fact that hospital proposed allowing an ultrasound technician to 
opt out of examining women contemplating abortion and to leave the room if any fetal 
anomalies became apparent, but he rejected any accommodation that prevented him from 
lecturing patients on religion). 
 286. See Strasser, supra note 13, at 29 (indicating that expanding conscience legislation 
to procedures beyond abortion suggests “exemptions for those not wishing to promote same-
sex marriage might well expand”). 
 287. See generally Catherine Grealis, Note, Religion in the Pharmacy: A Balanced 
Approach to Pharmacists’ Right to Refuse to Provide Plan B, 97 GEO. L.J. 1715 (2009) 
(describing history of adoption of pharmacists’ conscience legislation). 
 288. See State Policies in Brief: Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, GUTTMACHER 
INSTITUTE (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ICC.pdf. 
 289. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12CV158-HSO-RHW, 2012 WL 
6831407 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 20, 2012) (dismissing suit filed by Catholic hospital); Korte v. 
U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 912 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Ill. 2012) (denying for-profit 
construction company’s conscience claim). In a forthcoming paper, I refer to this 
development as “Free Exercise Lochnerism,” which revives business attacks on the 
regulatory state through religious liberty arguments. 
 290. Judith Blake, Abortion and Public Opinion: The 1960-1970 Decade, 171 SCIENCE 
2014] DOCTORING DISCRIMINATION 755 
 
popular support for abortion reform and legislative initiatives were themselves the 
catalyst for controversy.291  
I do not intend to suggest that marriage equality will follow an identical path. 
Even the most favorable view of abortion sees it as a neutral medical procedure. 
Marriage, by contrast, is cause for celebration. Nonetheless, the experience of 
medical conscience legislation should give gay rights advocates and their allies in 
state legislatures pause, especially given the recent movement to allow 
conscientious objection to contraceptive coverage, despite overwhelming public 
support for and use of contraception. 
While it is possible that some states will legalize same-sex marriage more 
quickly if wide-ranging exemptions are included, such exemptions may also 
entrench opposition and lead to a permanent state of inequality between opposite- 
and same-sex couples. The experience of medical conscience legislation edifies. 
The pre-Roe era acknowledged the diversity of religious views on the moral status 
of the fetus and the moral agency of women seeking abortion.292 Religious support 
of abortion rights was highly visible, with Protestant clergy tending to back reform 
and even help women access abortions.293 Conscience and religion were accepted 
bases for a pro-choice position. Today, by contrast, conscience and religion are 
presumed to mean antichoice. The archetypal doctor driven by conscience to refuse 
his patient’s requests is cemented in the public mind. Thus, members of Congress 
suggest allowing hospitals to let pregnant women die in the name of conscience, 
without any countervailing conscience claim from women or their doctors.294 
Employers challenge requirements that insurance plans include contraception on 
grounds of conscience.295 Lost is the recognition that religious and moral beliefs 
exist on both sides. 
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Similarly, one should question assumptions that opposition to same-sex 
marriage will be short-lived and exemptions eventually repealed. Exemptions may 
survive even if the public no longer supports them.296 This may be particularly 
likely with regard to gay rights; empirical studies demonstrate that, across states, 
incongruence between public support and policy works to their detriment.297 For 
example, despite majority support in every state (except Utah) for preventing 
sexual orientation discrimination in employment and housing,298 only twenty-one 
states have enacted such statutes.299 In part, this incongruence is attributable to 
“[p]owerful conservative religious interest groups [that] strongly affect gay rights 
policy at the expense of majoritarian congruence.”300 There is reason to think that 
these interest groups will not be satisfied with even ample “marriage conscience 
protection” and will, in the end, seek to shape the law to their vision of society.301  
B. Burden on Same-Sex Couples 
Despite anticipating widespread objections in the absence of MCP,302 scholars 
also predict that its existence will impose little burden on same-sex couples. They 
make two intertwined claims: that few businesses or individuals will take 
advantage of marriage conscience protection;303 and that burdens on same-sex 
couples will not be onerous.304  
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The medical model suggests these empirical judgments should be viewed with 
skepticism. Medical conscience legislation has contributed to a legal landscape of 
decreased access to abortion. It encourages refusal from providers who hold no 
strong moral or religious objections to abortion, because it does not require them to 
establish the sincerity of their beliefs or assume alternate burdens.305 Indeed, 
eighty-six percent of OB/GYNs never provide abortion,306 although only seven 
percent of them are opposed to it in all instances.307 Allowing institutional refusal 
also can generate refusal disproportionate to individual physicians’ moral 
judgments. For example, at least sixteen percent of hospitals prohibit tubal 
ligations, although few physicians object to performing them.308 The burden on 
patients can be weighty.309  
In the same-sex marriage context, predicting how frequent objections will be is 
no easy task. One should hesitate, however, to draw conclusions from the number 
we see now. These may be low precisely because discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, whether religion based or not, remains legal in approximately half the 
states.310 Today’s legal refusal of services, benefits, or housing could be 
tomorrow’s discrimination lawsuit—or, under MCP, acceptable objection. If in fact 
it is the act of marriage, rather than the status of the person, that offends certain 
religious people, refusals actually should increase as same-sex couples gain access 
to marriage.  
As with controversial medical procedures, MCP could be expected to permit 
objections that are not strongly held or sincere. Lynn Wardle identifies one 
example that seems undermotivated: of twenty-four San Diego county clerks who 
claimed religious objections to same-sex marriage, eighteen withdrew their 
objections rather than be reassigned from issuing marriage licenses.311 Under MCP, 
all twenty-four would be accommodated. 
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Even assuming few individuals would object, the enactment of institutional 
exemptions inevitably would burden same-sex couples. Consider, for example, that 
in Washington, which recently legalized marriage equality, more than thirty percent 
of patient admissions are to Catholic hospitals.312 Many religiously affiliated 
organizations are formidable economic actors. There are 900 religiously affiliated 
colleges and universities, with 1.7 million students.313  Under MCP, they could deny 
recognition of couples’ marital status for housing, benefits, emergency contacts, 
and so forth.  
Denial of services by small businesses might also have widespread impact. 
Exemption proponents predict that the market will solve any access problems. But 
many gay couples live in areas with small markets; according to the 2000 census, 
same-sex partner households exist in 99.3% of all U.S. counties.314 In communities 
where there is large-scale opposition, these predictions rely on brave store owners 
willing to take considerable personal and financial risk. Laycock suggests that 
stores self-identify as willing or refusing by posting signs in the windows; then 
“same-sex couples planning a wedding might be forced to pick their merchants 
carefully, like black families driving across the South half a century ago.”315 But 
this notion discounts the collective action problem that public accommodations 
laws solve. MCP, moreover, dampens the ability of supportive businesses and 
religious organizations to make a clear statement in favor of marriage equality, 
precisely because they must accommodate employees unwilling to serve same-sex 
couples. 
Of course, any evaluation of the burden of conscience legislation on same-sex 
couples depends on how one defines “burden.” MCP proponents describe denial of 
access to services and to marriage itself as “mere inconvenience,” whereas 
“[r]equiring a merchant to perform services that violate his deeply held moral 
commitments is far more serious, different in kind and not just in degree.”316 They 
argue that this weightier burden should only be imposed on a small business where 
there would be a “substantial hardship” on same-sex couples (MCP would never 
impose this burden on religiously affiliated objecting businesses, irrespective of the 
consequences of the denial).317  
To be sure, when the burden is presented as, for example, having to buy a 
wedding dress at one store instead of another, it seems insubstantial. But this 
perspective understates the harms. Failure to issue a marriage license or perform a 
marriage could delay or deny a couple’s union. Even with regard to mundane 
transactions, not all goods and services are fungible in terms of quality and price, 
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despite what MCP advocates seem to assume.318 Reserving a room at a bed and 
breakfast or ordering tablecloths for an anniversary party, for example, could cost 
same-sex couples additional time, money, or both. With denial of spousal benefits 
permitted under MCP, substantial out-of-pocket expenses accrue.319 Gay couples 
denied benefits would spend an additional $28,595 to $211,993 in health costs and 
lose up to $32,253 in pension income.320  
Even when denied non-urgent commercial transactions, couples would suffer 
significant dignitary and psychological damage.321 Being discriminated against is a 
serious harm in its own right irrespective of the importance of the good sought in 
commerce. For this reason, no serious argument exists that the Civil Rights Act 
should not apply to theaters and restaurants, because movies and dinners out are not 
urgent or essential. Same-sex couples would face uncertainty as to where they can 
seek goods or services, feel humiliated by scrutiny and judgment that are not 
normally part of a commercial transaction, and lose trust in public and private 
institutions. A lesser burden would fall on opposite-sex couples, who would also 
endure inquiries into their private relationships. Finally, as NeJaime argues, MCP 
fails to appreciate “the profound connection between same-sex relationships and 
lesbian and gay identity” and thus does not “address how it burdens status, or the 
enactment of sexual orientation identity.”322  
The proposed marriage conscience protection instead works to send gay identity 
and relationships back into the closet. A lesbian could purchase a wedding dress 
from an objecting shop by pretending to marry a man, or to buy it for a nonwedding 
party. A gay man could visit his husband in the hospital by identifying as a relative. 
A couple could live together as “roommates.”  
One reasonably could object that burdens would still be higher in the medical 
context because doctors are gatekeepers to healthcare in a way that the average 
business is not. Charo observes that, because licensing creates a monopoly on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 318. Brownstein, supra note 59, at 418–419. 
 319. Id. at 418. 
 320. Tara Siegel Bernard & Rob Lieber, The Costs of Being a Gay Couple Run Higher, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2009, at A1. 
 321. See, e.g., Gilbert Herdt & Robert Kertzner, I Do, but I Can’t: The Impact of 
Marriage Denial on the Mental Health and Sexual Citizenship of Lesbians and Gay Men in 
the United States, 3 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 33, 43–44 (2006) (concluding legal 
obstacles to marriage equality prevent same-sex couples from enjoying the physical and 
mental health benefits of marriage); Richard G. Wight, Allen J. LeBlanc & M.V. Lee 
Badgett, Same-Sex Legal Marriage and Psychological Well-Being: Findings from the 
California Health Interview Survey, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 339, 339 (2013) (“Being in a 
legally recognized same-sex relationship, marriage in particular, appeared to diminish mental 
health differentials between heterosexuals and lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons.”); see also 
Brief of the Am. Psychological Ass’n, the Am. Med. Ass’n, the Am. Acad. of Pediatricss, 
the Cal. Med. Ass’n, the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, the Am. Ass’n for Marriage & Family 
Therapy, the Nat’l Ass’n of Soc. Workers & Its Cal. Chapter & the Cal. Psychological Ass’n 
as Amici Curiae on the Merits in Support of Affirmance at 36, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 
S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144) (“By devaluing and delegitimizing the relationships that 
constitute the very core of a homosexual orientation, Proposition 8 compounds and 
perpetuates the stigma historically attached to homosexuality.”). 
 322. NeJaime, supra note 13, at 1228–29. 
760 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:703 
 
medical services, “[t]he situation is not one in which a free market of products, 
suppliers and buyers seek one another out without constraint.”323 Instead, when 
doctors and pharmacists refuse to serve them, “patients have nowhere to turn,”324 a 
situation that is exacerbated in emergencies. Given the lack of barriers and 
emergency situations, one could expect the market to work with regard to ordinary 
goods and services.  
It does not follow, however, that the burden of MCP would be insubstantial. 
Like medical legislation, MCP applies to licensed professionals, such as 
counselors, and to monopoly-like institutions, such as hospitals, adoption agencies, 
and social service providers. It extends to a variety of private, public, and quasi-
public entities and all individual employees in a state.  
In practice, conscientious objection protection could represent a more significant 
encumbrance on marriage than on medical procedures, because the central purpose 
of legalizing marriage between same-sex couples is the recognition of that marriage 
by third parties. As Mary Anne Case argues, marriage today is “thin,” allowing 
married couples to live together, have sex, procreate, or differentiate their roles—or 
not—“while still having their commitment to one another recognized by third 
parties including the state.”325 Marriage forms the mechanism through which 
employers deliver benefits, businesses give deals, and the government distributes 
public funds.326 It provides a rule that reduces the need to inquire more deeply into 
the parties’ relationship.327 Thus, as Case says, civil marriage’s “principal legal 
function, at least while the relationship is ongoing, may not be to structure relations 
between the members of the marital couple, but instead to structure their relations 
with third parties.”328 
The importance of third-party recognition sharply differentiates same-sex 
marriage from controversial medical procedures. No procedure provides a status 
that third parties must (or do) use in order to allocate benefits or privileges. By 
contrast, what same-sex couples arguably seek is not just flowers or pensions, but 
recognition of their status as married. Whereas obligations to provide reproductive 
healthcare can be discharged by other individuals without impeding the patient’s 
objective,329 the duty not to discriminate cannot be fulfilled by anyone else. 
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Private law cannot substitute for this recognition.330 A same-sex couple may 
establish some rights and responsibilities without state recognition of their 
relationship.331 But they cannot contract to receive tax and social security benefits 
or public pensions, to be appointed as guardian of an incompetent partner, or to sue 
for the wrongful death of a partner.332 They cannot access family healthcare plans, 
discounted family rates, hospital visitation privileges, medical decision making, 
and family housing. In theory, a couple might contract around this lack of 
recognition, but, even in theory, the transaction costs would be inordinately high. In 
practice, couples are unlikely to be able to predict every third party they will 
encounter. 
Even if parties that refused to recognize a couple’s married status were few and 
far between, under MCP each same-sex couple would face, as now, significant 
barriers to full respect for their status as married. Third-party recognition would no 
longer be automatic. Decades after marrying, couples could still be denied 
recognition of their relationships. 
CONCLUSION 
Medicine is not like marriage. The centrality of ethical and moral questions to 
medicine sets it apart from business transactions. The physician is close to and 
responsible for the contested act; the same cannot be said for the wedding vendors, 
social services providers, and individuals to whom marriage conscience protection 
would apply. Nor is medical conscience legislation a promising model for 
protecting conscience or reducing conflict. If transferred to same-sex marriage 
objections, it would only create new conflicts of conscience.  
Without the medical analogy, marriage conscience protection loses its 
theoretical and practical underpinnings. One is left to consider values of religion 
and equality within the antidiscrimination framework, as our legal system has 
historically done. Without the rubric of conscientious objection, exemption 
proponents must engage with the status of those discriminated against and explain 
why such accommodations would not apply equally to race, sex, and religious 
discrimination. They must justify doing away with the longstanding separation 
between religious and secular institutions and confront a framework that requires 
balancing instead of absolute freedom for objectors. Narrow exemptions that vary 
across contexts of housing, employment, and public accommodation discrimination 
would be considered. Exemptions as broad as their MCP proposal are unlikely to 
succeed, as Laycock’s comment that “same-sex couples planning a wedding might 
be forced to pick their merchants carefully, like black families driving across the 
South half a century ago” should suggest.333  
Beyond the context of marriage, this Article’s identification of the principles 
justifying protection of conscientious objection provides the groundwork for 
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distinguishing between permissible and impermissible claims for conscientious 
objection. As invocations of “conscientious objection” spread to bus drivers334 and 
supermarket cashiers,335 these principles provide a theoretical bulwark to shore up 
the slippery slope of conscience. 
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